The fantasy of an international Jerusalem

In the uproar over President Trump’s announcement of U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, one constant refrain has been the insistence that, by longstanding international consensus, the city’s status has yet to be decided. In the portentous words of the recent UN General Assembly resolution protesting the American action, “Jerusalem is a final-status issue to be resolved through negotiations in line with relevant United Nations resolutions.”

The most “relevant” of those prior resolutions was the November 1947 resolution proposing partition of Palestine and envisaging, in addition to two independent states, one Arab and one Jewish, an entirely separate status for Jerusalem as a city belonging to no state but instead administered by a “special international regime.”

One might have thought that the wholesale Arab rejection of the entire partition plan, in all of its parts, would also have put paid to the idea of an internationalized Jerusalem. Evidently, however, this fantasy is too convenient to lie dormant forever.

That is why it’s useful to know that, almost exactly three decades before the 1947 UN plan, internationalization of Jerusalem was killed—and killed decisively. Who killed it? Thereby hangs a tale, but here is a hint: it was neither the Arabs, nor the Jews.

• To continue reading this article, go to Mosaic Magazine, right here.

A Franciscan monk reads a French translation of Gen. Edmund Allenby's proclamation putting Jerusalem under martial law, December 11, 1917. Allenby at center; François Georges-Picot, on far right.

Image: A Franciscan monk reads a French translation of Gen. Edmund Allenby’s proclamation putting Jerusalem under martial law, December 11, 1917. Allenby at center; François Georges-Picot, on far right. Matson Collection, Library of Congress.

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Celebrating partition

This post first appeared in the English-language opinion section of Israel Hayom on November 29. It is a précis of a more in-depth essay published in Mosaic Magazine on November 27.

UNSCOP Palestine partition map, 1947Earlier this month, the governments of Britain and Israel marked the centennial of the Balfour Declaration with great fanfare. In London and Jerusalem, prime ministers, parliamentarians and protesters weighed in.

In comparison, notice of this week’s 70th anniversary of the 1947 U.N. partition resolution, the first international legitimation of a Jewish state, has been relatively subdued. Why?

A centennial is certainly a rare thing, and the Balfour Declaration makes for dramatic telling. But the vote over the partition resolution had plenty of drama, too. Many people alive today recall it vividly, and the excitement of it is easily retrievable on YouTube.

So why, one asks again, did the Balfour Declaration’s 100th anniversary resonate, while the partition-vote anniversary does not?

First, the subsequent 70 years have been marked by repeated assaults on Israel’s legitimacy, launched from within that very same United Nations. This reached an obscene climax in 1975, when the General Assembly passed a resolution defining Zionism “as a form of racism and racial discrimination.” And while the General Assembly revoked that resolution in 1991, U.N. bodies continue to defame Israel through hateful resolutions.

The second cause for reticence is the notion that the resolution wasn’t all that important anyway, so why bother? By 1947, the Jews in Palestine were 600,000-strong and unstoppable. For those who wish to emphasize Israel’s birth as the result only of battlefield grit and sacrifice, there is a logical prejudice against celebrating the U.N. vote as a watershed.

Third, the other half of the U.N. resolution poses a problem for some Israelis and supporters of Israel: It recommended the establishment of an Arab state as well as a Jewish one. Israeli leader Menachem Begin called it a “dismemberment contract,” and promised that it would “never be recognized.” Not surprisingly, for Zionist opponents of partition today, it is nothing to celebrate.

But even Israelis who favored partition might not be in a mood to celebrate. This is because the partition plan came with a map, a division that would have left all of Jerusalem under international control, surrounded on all sides by the proposed Arab state. It also would have cut the Jewish state into three chunks, linked at two points. Zionist centrists accepted partition but bristled at the proposed borders.

When, in the spring of 1948, the Arabs went to war to throttle Israel, Israel countered by seizing part of the territory allotted to the Arab state and pushed through a corridor to the besieged Jews in western Jerusalem. Israel then insisted that the Arabs, by going to war, had nullified the partition plan and its map. In 1949, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion declared the resolution “null and void,” bereft of all “moral force.”

In this view, Israel did not arise from the U.N. resolution but emerged upon its death. Why then celebrate a dead letter, strangled at birth by the Arabs, and then buried by Israel?

All these reasons explain why relatively little attention is being paid to the 70th anniversary of the U.N. vote.

But this is a missed opportunity.

Most obviously, the Balfour Declaration spoke only of a “national home” for the Jews, which the British later interpreted to be less than a state. The 1947 U.N. resolution, by contrast, explicitly recommended a Jewish state.

But there is another compelling reason to emphasize the 1947 resolution: The Arabs rejected it. And because they did, preferring war, they cannot escape their share of responsibility for the war’s consequences: their “Nakba” (“Catastrophe”).

Prior to the vote, the General Assembly empowered a “special committee,” comprising representatives of 11 member states, to investigate the situation and make recommendations to the General Assembly. The Zionists wooed the committee, but the Palestinian Arab leaders boycotted it. Then not only did Arab leaders reject the committee’s majority report, which recommended partition, they even rejected the minority report, which proposed a federated, binational state. In the Arab view, the Jews had no right to anything – not a single immigrant, not a shred of self-government.

Their second mistake compounded the first. The Arabs misread the significance of the partition vote. The two rising superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, drove the “aye” vote forward. This, despite the fact that the Soviets had been hostile to Zionism and supportive of the Arabs all through the 1920s and 1930s. The sudden Soviet turnabout showed how strongly the wind was blowing against the Arabs.

Why did the Arabs reject the resolution? Because they thought that once the British left, they would defeat the Jews. An example is the testimony of the late Palestinian academic Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, a native of Jaffa, who left an account of the mood there on the eve of the war. The Arabs thought that “as the country belonged to them, they were the ones who would defend their homeland with zeal and patriotism. … There was a belief that the Jews were generally cowards.”

This is why the Arabs refused to accept partition, or a federated state, or any plan that recognized any Jewish rights at all. Why concede anything to the cowardly Jews? The people of Jaffa, Abu-Lughod said, believed that “if they made ready a bit … then they were sure to emerge victorious.”

Instead, the Palestinians went down to an ignominious defeat, dragging the Arab states with them. Indeed, their conduct in the war conformed almost precisely to the conduct they had expected of the Jews, making them contemptible in their own eyes and in the eyes of other Arabs.

It took more than 60 years for a Palestinian leader, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, to describe Palestinian and Arab rejection of partition as a “mistake,” which he did in an interview in 2011. But this is far from a full accounting.

That is why it remains important to mark this 70th anniversary, and every anniversary to come. It isn’t just a reminder of Israel’s legitimacy; it’s a reminder of Arab responsibility.

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Who wants to celebrate partition?

UNGA session, November 29, 1947

Why is there so little buzz surrounding the 70th anniversary of the UN General Assembly vote recommending the partition of Palestine, passed on November 29, 1947? You know, that dramatic vote that legitimated the idea of a Jewish state, and that famously produced dancing in the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

It’s more than fatigue from the Balfour Declaration centenary. While centrist Zionists accepted the UN partition plan, and the Communists and leftists in Palestine followed the Soviet lead in endorsing it, an ambivalence still attaches to the partition resolution. I explain why, in this sequel to my Mosaic Magazine essay “Who Saved Israel in 1947?”

Over the last month, the essay drew thoughtful responses from Benny Morris, Michael Mandelbaum, and Harvey Klehr. In my “last word” (title: “Why the 1947 UN Partition Resolution Must Be Celebrated”), I also respond to weighty questions posed by each of them. Would Israel have arisen without the UN partition resolution? Did the impact of the Holocaust tip the scales in favor of Israel at the UN? Did Israel follow the same path to legitimacy as other nations, or is there something unique (or deficient) in its standing in the world? If you haven’t followed the discussion, go to my “last word,” and work your way back from there.

Read here.

Image: The United Nations General Assembly in session, November 29, 1947.

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Israel’s first best friend

This month is the 70th anniversary of the UN General Assembly vote to partition Palestine, which legitimated the Jewish state. It’s going to be celebrated in a big way in New York, with a reenactment of the stirring vote. Vice-President Mike Pence will be there, to give the occasion an American bent. But do the United States and Truman deserve all the credit? Or should equal billing (or more) go to the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin? I look at the evidence in November’s essay at Mosaic Magazine. Responses will follow all month.

Read here.

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The metal detectors of Islam

Bauernfeind, entrance to Temple MountIsrael has capitulated over the metal detectors (and surveillance cameras) that it installed last week at the entrances to the Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif. As anyone familiar with the long history of the “status quo” in Jerusalem knows, the “crisis” is wholly manufactured, and is but the latest chapter in a fifty-year Israeli-Palestinian struggle over sovereign authority.

The Palestinian aim has been to expand the autonomous administration of the Haram ash-Sharif, permitted them in 1967, and turn the esplanade into an extra-territorial enclave by leveraging Israeli and international fears of a wider conflagration. In this long-term campaign, they have had much success, and the latest “crisis” has produced yet another Palestinian “victory.”

The episode has raised the question of just what constitutes legitimate security measures at Islamic holy shrines and iconic mosques. We live in a time when the primary threat to the security of these sites arises from Muslims themselves—notably, extremists bent on using them as launching pads for violent acts designed to destabilize and terrorize. Across the Muslim world, governments are acutely aware of the vulnerabilities of these sites, and have taken measures to secure them. In particular, they have resorted to a very commonplace technology: metal detectors.

At this link, I provide some prime examples, from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. How do these states differ from Israel? They are effective and sole sovereigns over the holy shrines and major mosques in their territory. Israel apparently is not.

“The Metal Detectors of Islam,” here, for a quick trip to Islam’s bucket list of top sites. Please place your keys and camera in the basket.

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