Author: Martin Kramer

Gaza en Égypte

On By Martin Kramer

“Voilà qui pourrait ressembler à une bénédiction”. C’est par ces mots qu’un responsable israélien anonyme a accueilli la destruction par le Hamas d’un morceau de la barrière frontalière qui sépare Gaza de l’Egypte, et qui a été suivie par un flot incontrôlé de centaines de milliers de Palestiniens de Gaza passant de Gaza en Egypte. “Il y a des gens au Ministère de la Défense, au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et au bureau du Premier Ministre que ça rend très heureux. Ils disent : ‘Enfin, le désengagement commence à fonctionner.'” A l’évidence, une frontière brisée entre l’Egypte et Gaza est un problème sécuritaire majeur pour Israël. Mais le matériel de guerre et l’argent destinés au Hamas passaient la frontière de toutes façons. Une frontière ouverte dédouane effectivement Israël de sa responsabilité sur la population de Gaza et peut le pousser à se séparer de son infrastructure restante et à couper les liaisons de ravitaillement à Gaza. Une grande partie de la responsabilité envers Gaza serait déplacée d’Israël à l’Egypte, ce qui pourrait expliquer les murmures de satisfaction entendus à Jérusalem.

Mais les conséquences de la grande brèche vont au-delà. Etant donné que Gaza et la Cisjordanie ne sont pas près d’être réunies, la question de la viabilité propre de Gaza comme entité séparée est obligée de refaire surface. Dans les années 90, les économistes parlaient des chances de succès de Gaza en fonction des aspects économiques : un investissement massif pourrait la transformer en un Singapour avec de hauts immeubles.

Mais dans un article écrit à l’été 1991, un géographe de pointe a expliqué que ce n’était pas faisable, et qu’il faudrait plus de terre pour rendre Gaza viable. La plupart de cette terre, a-t-il déclaré, devrait venir d’Egypte.

“Viabilité de Gaza : le besoin d’agrandissement de sa base terrestre” – tel était le titre d’un article de Saul B. Cohen, géographe américain distingué et ex-président du Queens College et de l’Association des Géographes américains.

Cohen commence par affirmer : un Gaza aux hauts immeubles “serait un désastre écologique… Pour réussir à devenir un mini-Etat, un qui servirait de “porte d’entrée” (…), Gaza aura besoin de terre supplémentaire.” Cohen a calculé qu’un Gaza viable aurait besoin d’environ 1.000 km² de territoire, ce qui requiert 650 km² supplémentaire.

Voici comment il a cartographié sa proposition :

L’Egypte fournirait une bande côtière sur la Méditerranée de 30 km (200 km²), faisant de Gaza une bande côtière sur la Méditerranée d’environ 75 km. L’Egypte fournirait également une partie de la plaine nord du Sinaï (300 km²), et Israël donnerait un morceau de son côté de la frontière (150 km²). Cela ferait une surface suffisante, écrit Cohen, “pour soulager la surpopulation de Gaza, garantir des réserves de terre agricole et naturelle et déployer des activités urbaines (dont des petites villes et des hôtels) pour fournir un paysage culturel unique d’immeubles peu élevés.” L’Egypte fournirait l’eau (par une extension du canal des eaux du Nil depuis El Arish) et l’énergie (par une conduite de gaz naturel).

Cohen pensait aussi que les colonies israéliennes de Gush Qatif “devraient à long terme être retirées“. Le long terme n’a pas pris tant de temps.

Les Accords d’Oslo ont éclipsé l’idée d’un mini-Etat de Gaza. Gaza était supposé trouver ses débouchés en Cisjordanie, par un couloir sécurisé. L’idée d’un Gaza étendu a été reprise peu de temps après le retrait unilatéral israélien par un géographe israélien (et ancien recteur de l’Université Hébraïque), Yehoshua Ben-Arieh. Il est parti de cette affirmation : un couloir vers la Cisjordanie ne suffirait pas à soulager la pression croissante à Gaza. Gaza ne pourrait être viable que si elle devenait un carrefour ou une porte, ce qui nécessiterait un port en eau profonde, un aéroport et une nouvelle ville.

Ben-Arieh a proposé un échange à trois flux. L’Autorité Palestinienne recevrait de 500 à 1.000 km² du nord Sinaï égyptien. Israël donnerait à l’Egypte 250 à 500 km² le long de leur frontière commune à Paran, et donnerait aussi à l’Egypte une route couloir vers la Jordanie. En Cisjordanie, l’Autorité Palestinienne cèderait à Israël la même superficie de territoire (500 à 1.000 km²) reçue de l’Egypte. C’est ainsi que Ben-Arieh dressait la carte sud de son plan.

Ben-Arieh a présenté son idée et ses cartes au Premier Ministre d’alors Ariel Sharon, qui, selon Ben-Arieh, a qualifié le plan de prématuré, mais ne l’a pas rejeté. “Peut-être qu’un jour ce sera une idée“, aurait-il dit.

Pour quiconque connaît les complexités des politiques, ces plans semblent grotesques. Mais alors que les géographes ratent souvent les détails diaboliques, ils savent ce que comporte de réellement provisoire la carte du Moyen Orient. C’est une représentation schématique d’autres forces, et si la puissance de ces forces change, la carte finira par le montrer. Il y avait 350.000 palestiniens à Gaza en 1967. Ils sont maintenant 1,3 millions, qui poussent le carcan des frontières étroites de Gaza avec une force croissante. Israël a le pouvoir et la détermination de les repousser. L’Egypte ne l’a pas, et c’est pour cette raison que le carcan a explosé à cet endroit là.

Cette pression ne va pas se relâcher, et puisque le Hamas cherche à la canaliser dans un “droit au retour sur les ruines d’Israël”, ce que les Etats-Unis rejettent, la question est : où Washington propose-t-il de dévier cette pression ? Son “processus de paix”, maintenant entièrement focalisé sur la Cisjordanie, peut-il dévier quoique ce soit ? A moins que la Maison Blanche n’arrive à faire changer le cours de l’eau, il est peut-être temps de revisiter les alternatives des géographes, et de demander honnêtement si elles sont plus grotesques que la politique actuelle.

Gaza into Egypt

On By Martin Kramer

“This may be a blessing in disguise.” This is how an unnamed Israeli official greeted the destruction by Hamas of a chunk of the border barrier separating Gaza from Egypt, followed by an unregulated flood of hundreds of thousands of Gazan Palestinians across the border into Egypt. “Some people in the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry and prime minister’s office are very happy with this. They are saying, ‘At last, the disengagement is beginning to work.'” Obviously, a broken border between Egypt and Gaza is a major security problem for Israel. But war matériel and money for Hamas crossed the border anyway. An open border effectively absolves Israel of responsibility for the well-being of Gaza’s population, and may prompt Israel to sever its remaining infrastructure and supply links to Gaza. A large part of the responsibility for Gaza would be shifted from Israel to Egypt, which might explain the satisfied murmurings in Jerusalem.

But the implications of the big breach go further. Given that Gaza and the West Bank are unlikely to be reunited, the question of Gaza’s own viability as a separate entity is bound to resurface. In the 1990s, economists talked about Gaza’s viability as a function of economics: massive investment could turn it into a high-rise Singapore. But in an article written back in the summer of 1991, a leading geographer argued that this wasn’t feasible, and that a viable Gaza would need more land. Most of it, he argued, would have to come from Egypt.

“Gaza Viability: The Need for Enlargement of its Land Base”—that was the title of an article by Saul B. Cohen, a distinguished American geographer and one-time president of Queens College and the Association of American Geographers. Cohen began with this basic assumption: a high-rise Gaza “would be ecologically disastrous… To become a successful mini-state, one that would serve as a ‘gateway’ or exchange-type state, Gaza will need additional land.” Cohen calculated that a viable Gaza would need about 1,000 square kilometers of territory—that is, an additional 650 square kilometers. This is how he mapped his proposal:

Egypt would provide a 30-kilometer stretch of Mediterranean coast (200 square kilometers), giving an expanded Gaza a total Mediterranean coast of about 75 kilometers. Egypt would also provide a stretch of the north Sinai plain (300 square kilometers), and Israel would kick in a parcel on its side of the border (150 square kilometers). This would be sufficient area, Cohen wrote, “to relieve Gaza’s overcrowding, provide for agricultural and natural land reserves, and spread urban activities (including small towns and hotels) to provide a unique, low-rise cultural landscape.” Egypt would provide water (by extending a Nile water canal from El Arish) and power (via a natural gas line). Cohen also believed that Israeli settlements at Gush Qatif “in the long run should be removed.” The long run didn’t take all that long.

The Oslo accords eclipsed the idea of a Gaza mini-state. Gaza was supposed to find its outlet in the West Bank, through a safe-passage corridor. The idea of an expanded Gaza was revived shortly before Israel’s unilateral withdrawal, by an Israeli geographer (and former rector of Hebrew University), Yehoshua Ben-Arieh. He proceeded from this assumption: a corridor to the West Bank would not suffice to relieve the pressure building up in Gaza. Gaza could only be viable if it became a crossroads or gateway, which would require a deep-water port, an airport, and a new city. Ben-Arieh proposed a three-way swap. The Palestinian Authority would be given 500 to 1,000 square kilometers of Egypt’s northern Sinai. Israel would give Egypt 250 to 500 square kilometers along their shared border at Paran, and would also give Egypt a corridor road to Jordan. On the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority would cede to Israel the same amount of territory (500 to 1,000 square kilometers) it received in Egypt. This is how Ben-Arieh mapped the southern part of his plan:

Ben-Arieh presented his idea and maps to then-prime minister Ariel Sharon, who (according to Ben-Arieh) described the plan as premature, but didn’t reject it. “Maybe one day it can become an idea,” he reportedly said.

To anyone who knows the complexities of the politics, these plans look fantastic. But while geographers often miss the devilish details, they do have an appreciation of how tentative the map of the Middle East really is. It is a schematic representation of other forces, and if the strength of those forces changes, the map will ultimately show it. There were 350,000 Palestinians in Gaza in 1967. Now there are 1.3 million, who are pushing against the envelope of Gaza’s narrow borders with growing force. Israel has the power and the resolve to push back. Egypt just doesn’t, which is why the envelope burst where it did.

That pressure will not relent, and since Hamas seeks to channel it into a “right of return” on the ruins of Israel, which the United States says it rejects, the question is this: where does Washington propose to divert this pressure? Can its “peace process,” now focused entirely on the West Bank, divert any of it? Unless the White House can make water flow uphill, perhaps now is time to revisit the geographers’ alternatives, and honestly ask whether they’re more fantastic than the present policy.

Memo from Gulfistan

On By Martin Kramer

Martin Kramer made these remarks at the 8th Herzliya Conference on January 21.

Lately it has been said that the Arabs are in a panic over the growing power of Iran. We are told that Arab rulers so fear the rise of Iran that this fear has eclipsed all others it’s the sum of all fears. And it’s making a new Middle East

That is what David Brooks, New York Times columnist, wrote last November: “Iran has done what decades of peace proposals have not done brought Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Palestinians and the U.S. together. You can go to Jerusalem or to some Arab capitals and the diagnosis of the situation is the same: Iran is gaining hegemonic strength over the region.” Martin Indyk of the Saban Center used the same language in a November interview. Iran, he said, was making “a bid for hegemony in the region.”

The Sunni Arab states, and… Israel, suddenly found that they were on the same side against the Iranians. And so that created a strategic opportunity which the [Bush] administration has finally come to recognize, and that’s, more than anything else, what’s fueling the move to Annapolis.

If something sounds too good to be true, it probably is. Just last month, Iran’s President Ahmadinejad was invited to attend the summit of Arab Gulf rulers (the Gulf Cooperation Council) in Qatar. That was the first time an Iranian president had ever attended a GCC summit. Two weeks later, Ahmadinejad arrived Mecca, for the haj pilgrimage, at the invitation of Saudi King Abdullah. It was the first pilgrimage by an Iranian president since Iran’s revolution. And as any travel log of Arab and Iranian ministers will show, this is just the tip of the iceberg.

What game are the Gulf Arabs playing? Pretend for a moment that you are ruler of a mythical state called Gulfistan, and I am your national security adviser. You have asked me to prepare a memo on our strategic situation. Page one:

  • Your Majesty, these are good times, thanks be to God. With oil at $100 a barrel, you are awash in cash. You have built mega-projects, you have bought new weapons, you have put us on the map. An American university and a French museum have opened branches here. Our skyline flashes glitz and prosperity. And there is no end in sight to the strong demand for our oil. The developed countries are addicted, and China and India need us more every day.
  • We are enjoying this boom under the protection of the greatest power on earth. The United States has built a front line of bases right through the Gulf, and not far from your palace. The Americans are here to protect the oil, and as long as we keep it flowing, we need not fear any enemy.
  • But Your Majesty doesn’t reward me with a mansion in Aspen to tell you only good news. True, it never rains in Gulfistan, but you wish to know if I see clouds on the horizon.
  • I see two clouds. There is President Bush, who thinks God has placed him on earth to make peace in the “Holy Land,” and bring so-called democracy to the Arabs; and there is President Ahmadinejad, who believes God has put him here to spread his Shiite perversion, and who wants nuclear weapons to turn Persia into a great power.
  • These are dangerous men who threaten our security. Your Majesty, wisdom dictates that we not chose sides in their quarrel. We need good relations with the Americans: they are our biggest customers, they will defend us against any foreign enemy, and the weapons they sell us make us look stronger than we are. But we need good relations with the Iranians too. Iran is so close, we can feel its breath on our faces, from OPEC to Iraq. Were Iran to subvert us, by inciting our Shiite minority or encouraging terror, it could burst our bubble.
  • Your Majesty, a nuclear Iran is undesirable. The Persians are pushy; nuclear weapons would only make them more arrogant. For a moment, we thought the Americans would bomb them to stop them. A few of us privately urged them to do that. But the Americans can’t make up their minds. Some think Iran should be bombed. Some think Iran has no weapons program. Others share the view of General Abizaid, the former U.S. commander here. “Iran is not a suicidal nation,” he’s said. “Nuclear deterrence would work with Iran.” The Americans would destroy Iran if it touched our oil, which is ultimately their oil. But if Iran is careful, it might get the bomb.
  • In this uncertain situation, we should balance America and Iran. On the one hand, let us reassure Iran that we are good neighbors. Tell the Iranians we will oppose aggression against them, and we won’t boycott their business or freeze their assets. On the other hand, let us reassure the Americans that we are good allies. Tell them we will stabilize oil prices and let them build their big bases off in the desert. We must keep Washington and Tehran equally close and equally distant.
  • Your Majesty, the Americans want you to shake the hands of Jews and give a hand to Palestinians, to support the so-called “peace process.” We are fortunate: God gave us all the oil and no Jews. He gave the Palestinians no oil and all the Jews. If you join the “peace process,” the Jew will be at your door, demanding “normalization,” and the Palestinian, as usual, will repay generosity with ingratitude. The wise course is to keep this an American problem. Say you will help, but set impossible conditions; come to their “peace conferences” but make no commitments. True, many of your people are moved by the plight of the Palestinians. But this won’t weigh on us, so long as they blame only the Jews and the Americans. If we avoid commitment, the blame will never fall on us.
  • If we are wise, we can keep up this game until Bush and Ahmadinejad fade into history. I, your humble servant, will continue to act as your adviser in these sensitive matters. Perhaps, then, I might be rewarded with that small estate outside London? My youngest wife very much fancies it…

Now obviously I’ve simplified things here. There is no typical Arab Gulf state like Gulfistan. Different Gulf states have different interests and different policies. That is why we have Gulf experts.

But this isn’t the place to explore what distinguishes, say, Kuwait from Saudi Arabia. The point I want to make is this:

We all know how little fuel there is right here to keep the Annapolis process going. At this point, Israelis and Palestinians are running on fumes. That’s why Martin Indyk said that most of the fuel for Annapolis would have to come from a grand anti-Iran coalition. But the reality is that the coalition never formed, and now even its premises have disintegrated. Assembling this coalition was bound to be difficult; after the NIE, it has become impossible.

We have been here before. Every few years, a prophet arises to proclaim a new Middle East, including Israel. In the 1990s, peace between Israel and the Palestinians was supposed to turn the Middle East into a zone of economic cooperation including Israel. Then we were told that Iraq’s liberation would turn the Middle East into a zone of democracy including Israel. A few months ago, we were told that the Iranian threat would turn the Middle East into a zone of political and military alliance including Israel.

This latest new Middle East has had the shortest life of them all. Apparently, new Middle Easts just aren’t what they used to be.