Author: Martin Kramer

From Afghanistan to Araby

On By Martin Kramer

This article by Martin Kramer appeared in National Review Online on December 10, 2001. Posted retroactively at Sandbox.

Will September 11 be remembered as a watershed in the Middle East? The answer to that question now depends on one factor only: the determination of the United States.

As it stands now, the answer is “no.” The terrorist hijackers of 9/11 were Arab Muslims from Saudi Arabia and Egypt — from the Middle East. But the actual conflict has been played out far above the heads of Middle Easterners. Afghanistan is to the Middle East what Alaska once was to North America — a remote and wild frontier, a place people know only by reputation, a redoubt where people go to hide. In the first weeks after the attacks, when the focus was on the hijackers and Islam, the Middle East seethed. But after October 7, when the bombing campaign began, the “war against terror” became an Afghan-U.S. war — and the Middle East tuned out.

While Americans pored over maps looking for Kunduz or Kandahar, people in the Middle East went back to business as usual. In recent weeks, demonstrations have fallen off to zero. The fabled “Arab street” is quiescent. Press reports of the war have been moved to the inside pages. And now that the Taliban are out and Osama is on the run, people are putting a distance between themselves and yesterday’s heroes. After all, the Taliban and Osama have been defeated. You don’t get idolized in the Arab world by losing.

Of course, there have been repercussions. The United States is asking Arab governments to freeze the funds of terrorist-supporting organizations. But the banking system in these countries is hardly transparent, and there isn’t any sure way to know whether the terrorists’ funds are really drying up. Yes, the United States is demanding that incitement be stopped in the religious schools in places like Saudi Arabia. But who is going to enforce and monitor this? Yes, Americans talk of political reform in the closed polities of the region. But who is going to press hard for change, when political openings seem most likely to benefit Osama look-alikes?

There is nothing here the Arabs can’t avoid by the usual combination of prevarication, obfuscation, and procrastination. They managed to torpedo a “new Middle East” engineered by America and based on peace with Israel. They can foil a “new Middle East” promoted by America and structured around the war against terror. And let there be no doubt: The Arabs have no interest in seeing their world reorganized around the needs and requirements of this war. The Arabs are always accused of terror, and so they are unenthusiastic about acknowledging America’s right to define it. A prime motive for their joining the coalition has been to influence that definition, and deflect it from themselves.

So 9/11 is not regarded in the Middle East as a great watershed. It is just another trial or tribulation to be endured until things can get back to normal — if there is anything normal about the combination of despotism, religious incitement, and tolerance of terror that is unique to the Middle East.

Well, you say, that isn’t good enough. They had better recognize that we are in a new ballgame, and that the rules have changed. They had better realize that if the United States went to the trouble of removing a regime 7,000 miles from its shores, in a remote and landlocked country, then the United States means business.

To which the Arabs say: Maybe — but it has yet to be proven in the Middle East. The Taliban have been kicked out? So what? America is much more cautious in the Middle East. Just look around the region, which is full of serial defiers of America, people who were once “enemy number one” and who still walk free. At the top of the list is Saddam Hussein, the living and breathing monument to defiance of America. Next is the Iranian regime, or those within it, and their allies in Hezbollah, who hit America time and again in the 1980s. Then comes Libya’s Qaddafi (exactly one Libyan operative went to jail for the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie).

The American victory in Afghanistan has made the Arabs uneasy, no doubt about it. But they reassure themselves by saying: Arabs aren’t Afghans. The Taliban were loathed as barbarians, and sat in the middle of nowhere. But the Arabs have friends everywhere; there is a lot of oil under their feet; and the Americans want stability and quiet. They won’t dare to push us too far.

Making 9/11 a turning point in the Middle East will require a lot more than the demonstration effect of the Afghan victory. (And that victory, by the way, isn’t complete until Osama’s head is on a pike.) For 9/11 to count in the Arab world, the United States is going to have to show its determination in the Middle East itself. In particular, it’s going to have to do two things: first, prove that it won’t tolerate rogues going about unsupervised while they plan some future Armageddon; and second, show that the terrorists flourishing in the dark corners of the Middle East and working against the region’s stability are no safer than the al Qaeda crowd.

To achieve the first, spiking the guns of the rogues, the United States has no alternative but to turn up the heat on Saddam Hussein. If 9/11 is to mean anything in the Middle East, it has to mean something for the future of Saddam. No one knows for sure whether Saddam had anything to do with 9/11, but it doesn’t matter. If he is not dealt with now, the day might come when the entire Middle East will have to place an emergency call to Washington. Saddam may be the only leader in the region with the will, the way, and the lack of restraint needed to plunge the region into a cataclysm. The United States has an advantage now, and it should not fail to press it. The Arabs and the Europeans will whine and warn through the build-up to D-Day. But if the United States is resolute, they will fall into line. They usually do.

Then there is the second goal: getting the terrorists out of the Middle East itself. By the Arabs’ account, there are no terrorists in the Middle East. There are only “resistance” groups — like Hezbollah and Hamas and Islamic Jihad. When they kill civilians with suicide bombers, this is merely legitimate struggle against occupation.

If the United States allows the so-called “Arab street” to define what is and is not terrorism, then to the Middle East, 9/11 will have changed nothing. The American definition should be unequivocal: These three groups are terrorists with a global reach. In the case of Hezbollah, the case is clear enough — less than a decade ago, they brought down two buildings in another “American” city, Buenos Aires, killing hundreds. But if anyone thinks that a suicide bomb in Jerusalem or Haifa is not felt around the globe, they haven’t heard yet about globalization. The actions of these groups undermine the stability of the entire region, because they bring it closer to war. And a Middle East closer to war is likelier to become a Middle East where Americans and American interests will be endangered.

In this respect, the Palestinian response to the terror attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa is not just a test. It’s the final exam. We have now seen the first major wave of post-September 11 terrorism. The Arabs are poised on the edge of their seats to see whether anything has changed, or whether the “resistance” can go on blowing up Israeli Jews as usual.

If it can, then General Zinni might as well pack his bags. The United States should hold a “victory in Afghanistan” parade on Fifth Avenue, and then try to forget the whole episode. But if the war against terrorism is about anything, it is about zero tolerance for paradise-obsessed suicide bombers taking themselves and innocent victims to fiery deaths. And the people who have to acknowledge this are not Brazilians or Australians. First and foremost, they are the Arabs, whose societies have tolerated the creation of production lines for suicide terrorists. The message of the United States on this point has to be unequivocal: Hamas and Jihad are Osama and the al Qaeda. Whoever allows such terrorists to flourish under his roof will be Talibanized. Not next year. Not next month. Now.

Will 9/11 be a watershed in the Middle East? If the United States leaves it to the Middle East, the answer will be “no.” But it might become a “yes” — if America only shows the same resolve in Araby that it has shown in Afghanistan.

El secuestro del Islam

On By Martin Kramer

Martin Kramer, “El secuestro del Islam,” Letras Libres (Madrid), noviembre 2001, pp. 18-19.

El Islam, una religión de más de mil millones de fieles, ha sido secuestrado. Con la confirmación de las sospechas de la primera semana, los atentados suicidas contra el World Trade Center y el Pentágono son el coronamiento de casi veinte años de terrorismo perpetrado en nombre del Islam. A medida que se han ido acumulando los estratos violentos, el Islam mismo ha terminado por estar relacionado, en la opinión mayoritaria de Occidente, con el terrorismo. Es un viraje trágico, del cual es en alguna medida responsable la amplia mayoría de musulmanes moderados.

El Islam no es más propenso al terrorismo que cualquiera otra fe monoteísta. Como sus hermanos, el cristianismo y el judaísmo, puede ser compasivo y severo en la práctica; como aquéllas, también profesa el amor a Dios y a la humanidad de todos los hombres, sean o no sean creyentes. El Islam ha servido antaño de base para órdenes florecientes, tolerantes y pacíficas.

Pero los sociólogos sostendrán que la religión, siempre, se convierte en lo que deciden sus fieles. Si este es el caso, entonces el islamismo, tal como lo entienden ya demasiados musulmanes, está en peligro de convertirse en un manifiesto que propugna el terror. La razón: ya demasiados musulmanes han permanecido en silencio.

La frase “terrorismo islámico” se incorporó por primera vez al vocabulario una mañana de 1983 en Beirut, donde dos atentados suicidas destruyeron las barracas de los cuerpos de paz franceses y estadounidenses. El recuento norteamericano fue de 241 muertos; los chiítas que lo planificaron, inspirados por el Ayatola Jomeini, se atribuyeron la responsabilidad en nombre de la yihad islámica. Durante décadas los pensadores modernizadores islámicos se habían esforzado en desmilitarizar el concepto de yihad —la lucha librada “en el sendero de Dios”. Los revolucionarios seculares habían arrumbado el término, empleando en cambio los términos de “resistencia” y “liberación”. Sin embargo, fue una acción de la yihad lo que causó la retirada estadounidense del Líbano, y el efecto fue electrizante. Había comenzado una nueva etapa en la que los extremistas musulmanes interpretaron su fe como una patente para asesinar a los forasteros, “enemigos de Dios”. Los clérigos islamistas radicales escudriñaron los textos sagrados del Islam en busca de justificaciones para la violencia, y las encontraron. En los años siguientes, los clérigos y los terroristas ampliaron su patente. Al comienzo, se limitaba a “los intrusos” en las tierras musulmanas: fuerzas extranjeras, embajadas y ciudadanos. Más tarde se extendió a fin de incluir instalaciones “enemigas” en terceros países y, finalmente, a los ciudadanos en las “tierras de los infieles”. No había límite moral que detuviera la escalada.

A la par, las operaciones suicidas se hicieron rutinarias. El suicidio está prohibido por la fe islámica. Antes, en 1983, sólo un puñado de clérigos radicales estaba dispuesto a clasificar las acciones al estilo kamikaze como “martirio”, lo que aseguraba la inmediata entrada al Paraíso. A las primeras operaciones se sucedió un intenso debate sobre la ley religiosa, en el cual algunos clérigos estuvieron a favor y muchos en contra.

Pero a medida que transcurrieron los años, los “mártires” se convirtieron en héroes populares y menguó la firmeza de los críticos. Cuando, el pasado abril, el supremo muftí de Arabia Saudita insinuó que tales acciones no eran sino suicidios, el rector de la universidad egipcia de Azhar, supuesto bastión moderado, se arredró (sostuvo que se podían permitir, aunque no contra la gente común). En algunos sectores, el “mártir” es tenido por el más noble de los fieles; de acuerdo con un respetado clérigo sunita, “estas operaciones son la manifestación suprema de la yihad”.

Dadas las circunstancias, es posible reclutar ya no un “mártir” sino a decenas. Y por primera vez los que planifican el terrorismo pueden concebir lo que parecía inimaginable: muchas operaciones suicidas simultáneas, llevadas a cabo por equipos de “mártires”.

Es una paradoja que, hasta hace unos años, el propio Medio Oriente sea menos vulnerable a la violencia extrema. Los regímenes de casi todos los países —cabe destacar a Egipto, Argelia y Arabia Saudita— han eliminado a sus opositores musulmanes. Pero han abierto una “válvula de seguridad” —no contra ellos mismos, sino contra los Estados Unidos. En consecuencia, la región está rebosante de instigaciones.

Esto se ha visto acompañado de una timidez moral entre los musulmanes moderados. Han condenado y desconocido las atrocidades en Nueva York y Washington, y no hay motivo para dudar de su sinceridad. Pero ellos mismos han guardado silencio ante hechos semejantes perpetrados en menor escala en otros lugares. Cada pequeña atrocidad socavaba las mismas inhibiciones religiosas que habrían evitado el asesinato en masa de hace unas semanas. Y en el mundo globalizado, si se traspasan los límites en el Medio Oriente se traspasan por doquier.

En años recientes, en Occidente algunos analistas del Islam han asegurado que se aprecia una paulatina evolución hacia una reforma ilustrada. Lo sucedido hace unas semanas fue lo contrario: el descenso hacia una guerra santa medieval. Para detener la regresión, la mayoría moderada tendrá que oponerse a la movilización de la religión islámica con fines bélicos. Los individuos pueden encontrar amparo en su fe en épocas de adversidad. Se puede invocar la religión ante la pérdida. Pero es imposible desplegar la religión para justificar el asesinato y la inmolación sin socavar los fundamentos mismos de la religión.

En los compungidos rostros de los musulmanes respetables se advierte algo más que pesar por el duelo en los Estados Unidos. Se advierte la conciencia creciente de que los individuos que derribaron las Torres Gemelas han puesto en peligro al Islam. Sólo los musulmanes pueden redimirlo.

— Traducción de Aurelio Major

Terrorism? What terrorism?!

On By Martin Kramer

This op-ed by Martin Kramer appeared in the Wall Street Journal on November 15, 2001. Posted retroactively at Sandbox.

The Middle East Studies Association of North America convenes Saturday in San Francisco. Its membership includes 2,600 “experts” on the Middle East, most of them based in universities. On Sept. 21, MESA’s board issued a statement on the terror attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It encapsulates all the ills of this very sick discipline—one that did nothing to prepare America for the encounter with Muslim extremism, and that can’t contribute anything to America’s defense.

Before we get to the statement, a little background is necessary. For 50 years, American universities and foundations, along with the U.S. government, have fostered the growth of Middle Eastern studies. Today, most Americans can take degrees in Middle Eastern politics, history, and languages without crossing a state line. Fourteen Middle East programs are National Resource Centers—that is, they enjoy an annual subsidy from the American taxpayer, through the Department of Education.

Some of these scholars have done important work. But when it comes to contemporary affairs, their record has been abysmal. The last time they basked in the national limelight, a decade ago, they warned that a war to expel Iraq from Kuwait would be disastrous. Later, in order to burnish the image of contemporary Islam, they downplayed the growth of Muslim extremism, helping to lull America into complacency.

In so doing, they dutifully followed the lead of Columbia University’s Edward Said, an honorary member of MESA. In introducing the latest edition of his book, “Covering Islam,” Mr. Said mocked “speculations about the latest conspiracy to blow up buildings, sabotage commercial airliners and poison water supplies.” Such talk was based on “highly exaggerated stereotyping.”

Many denounce U.S. policy in extreme terms, believing the Middle East is subjected to a “neoliberal, repressive ‘pax Americana'”—a description of the American role offered by incoming MESA president Joel Beinin of Stanford. The past head of Columbia’s Middle East Institute, Richard Bulliet, has called American efforts to promote democracy part of “a world hegemonic discourse of Western cultural imperialism.”

This is the necessary background to understanding MESA’s statement. Its most striking feature is a studied avoidance of the words “terror,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist.” These were “violent acts,” “horrific acts,” and “tragic events.” But even now, the board members of MESA cannot bring themselves to describe any Arabs or Muslims—even suicide kamikazes who kill thousands of American civilians—as terrorists.

It’s not surprising. For years the academics’ response to terrorism has been to act as amplifiers for the “grievances” behind it. For the professors, terrorism was a kind of political protest—and since they sympathized with its supposed motives, they expelled the word “terrorism” from their lexicon. This weekend’s conference demonstrates the neglect: With the exception of a hastily announced special panel, nothing in the program deals with terrorism.

MESA urges calm while “those who planned and perpetrated the crimes are identified and brought to justice in courts of law.” Crimes—not acts of war. The same professors, who in one breath will tell you that the roots of terrorism are political, will tell you in the next breath that mass murder should be treated like a felony.

And the scholars imply that lone men committed these “crimes,” ignoring the role of the state or states that must have aided, abetted and sheltered the terrorists. MESA’s bottom line: No use of force is legitimate, even against terrorists and their accomplices.

Finally, MESA’s board members are “deeply concerned that innocent people in the Middle East may become the targets of misguided retaliation.” Needless to say, no one wants “misguided retaliation.” But where is the companion sentence expressing “deep concern” that attacks could recur? It isn’t there, despite the fact that the Middle East may be pregnant with more such attacks.

In short, the academics remain in a state of denial. They refuse to acknowledge that their paradigms collapsed with the Twin Towers. But the record of failure exacts no price. Ironically, the very same professors who helped to anesthetize America to the dangers of radical Islam are enjoying a windfall: Their phones don’t stop ringing, their books sell briskly, and their courses fill to overflowing.

During or after this crisis, they will find some pliant senator or congressman willing to propose additional budgets for Middle Eastern studies under the rubric of national security. The State Department already wants to use professors for “public diplomacy” in Muslim countries.

But as we begin to ask why the country was so unprepared, one conclusion is inescapable: The academics are part of the problem, not its remedy. It will be necessary to start from scratch in building the understanding that must inform America’s future actions. There are no quick fixes, and no steps should be taken before a comprehensive assessment of national needs in Middle Eastern studies.

In the meantime, there is no danger in simply ignoring the professors who meet this weekend in San Francisco. MESA’s board called on “those with responsibility for U.S. policy in the Middle East and the Islamic world to avail themselves of the insights of scholarship.” Mr. President, don’t waste your time. The professors don’t meet the course prerequisites. Members of Congress: There is no justification for an additional penny of support for this empire of error—and no better time to reexamine the federal subsidies it already enjoys.

This letter by Edward Said appeared in the Wall Street Journal on December 4, 2001.

In regard to Martin Kramer’s Nov. 15 editorial-page piece “Terrorism? What Terrorism?”:

Mr. Kramer’s current book, “Ivory Towers on Sand,” from which his critique was taken, was published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the academic arm of AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee). This most certainly is not a serious account of modern Islam.

What Mr. Kramer quotes from my book, “Covering Islam,” is as misleading as everything else in his polemic. My book was originally published by Pantheon in 1981; the preface I wrote for it appeared in the Vintage edition of 1997. In it, I make absolutely clear my disagreement with Islamist politics, rejecting them entirely as an alternative for Arabs and Muslims. The passage Mr. Kramer quotes occurs in a context—that a fixation on violence and terror in Western accounts of Islam distorts the complexities and diversity of a world that includes 1.5 billion Muslims, about whom little other than a relative handful of militants is widely known—that he suppresses, making it seem that I wasn’t aware of the potential for disaster.

Like Ariel Sharon, Mr. Kramer tries to exploit the current crisis as a way of obscuring Israel’s terrorist military occupation (now in its 35th year) of Palestine.

Edward W. Said
University Professor
Columbia University
New York