Author: Martin Kramer

A plan for surrender (to Hamas)

On By Martin Kramer

Israeli Yossi Alpher today publishes a piece in the International Herald Tribune, under the headline “Stop Starving the Gazans.” Alpher claims that the economic sanctions imposed on Gaza after the Hamas power grab in mid-2007 (what he calls “the economic-warfare strategy”) have failed totally; indeed, they have “produced no political or strategic benefit.” “There is not a shred of evidence,” he adds, that economic punishment or incentives toward Palestinians have ever worked. The “blockade” should be abandoned unconditionally—which, by the way, is precisely the main demand of Hamas.

Not a shred of evidence? Here’s some evidence. Hamas sank in Palestinian public opinion in Gaza after it seized power. The most reliable Palestinian pollster got these answers from Gazans (in percentages):

So something was happening in Gaza: a steady erosion of support for Hamas and its leader, benefitting both Fatah and Abbas. What caused it? No doubt Hamas did much to offend Gazans, from its violent coup d’etat to its attempts at social Islamization. But many analysts have pointed primarily to the economic sanctions and the failure of Hamas strategy to get them lifted. “Hamas was losing popularity before this operation,” says Rashid Khalidi. “It was losing popularity because it had failed to open the crossings.” Hamas could read the trend, and it’s why it refused to renew the “lull” and renewed its rocket fire. “Hamas wanted to weaken the Israeli siege,” says Hisham Milhem, “because they have been hurt politically and economically because of the siege.”

So what would the Alpher plan of unconditionally ending the “siege” mean? Hamas would gain credit for lifting the blockade, and have something to show for the war, beyond its mere survival. The opposition to Hamas would be severely undercut, and the split between the West Bank and Gaza would be made permanent. The “peace process” industry, now gearing up again in Washington, would be reduced to the hopeless task of trying to “moderate” Hamas, probably through desultory “engagement.” While we waited for Hamas to have an epiphany, the maps of various final status options might as well be folded up and put in the archives for another twenty years. And Israel might as well fly a white flag over the crossings.

Economics will be crucial when the guns fall silent and the rockets stop falling. Here, too, Israel and the international community have to remain steadfast if they want an outcome that doesn’t just stop the violence today, but also provides hope for tomorrow. When the dust settles, the people of Gaza will be desperate for a return to some normalcy—one denied to them under the rule of jihadists who fanatically tell them they must suffer on the deluded promise that Israel will be destroyed, and that Gazans will one day “return” to repossess all that they lost 60 years ago. Normalcy can be restored only if the needs of Gazans are answered by the international community and the legitimate Palestinian Authority—without the Hamas middleman.

Hamas in Gaza was a bubble. Let’s not inflate it again.

Sanctioning ‘resistance’

On By Martin Kramer

Israel’s war against Hamas, now in its third week, is probably closer to its end than to its beginning. Israel has said that the “operation”—there is an official aversion to the term “war”—is close to achieving its stated goal of securing sustained quiet for the south of Israel. Quiet refers to a cessation of rocket fire, and sustainability alludes to an end to weapons smuggling into Gaza from Egypt. These are the two elements that Israel seeks in a cease-fire.

But there is also an unstated goal of the war. It is the humiliation and degradation of Hamas, to such an extent that its continued rule over Gaza will be undermined. As long as Hamas remains in power, it will continue to indoctrinate and prepare for “resistance”—its term for violent jihad-style attacks on Israel. This is the Iran-inspired alternative to acceptance of compromise with Israel, and it is the doctrine that animates Hezbollah as well. Discrediting and delegitmating “resistance” is a prime Israeli objective—one shared by the United States, and presumably by all supporters of any Israeli-Palestinian “peace process,” however configured.

There is a present danger concealed in the diplomacy toward achieving Israel’s stated goal, which could damage its unstated goal.

It is the possibility that a cease-fire might include a lifting of Israeli economic sanctions on Gaza. Israel imposed these sanctions after Hamas seized power in a violent coup in June 2007. Since that time, Israel has restricted imports via its crossings to “humanitarian” shipments of food and medicines, as well as fuel. The crossings have been closed to most commercial products and virtually all building materials.

The sanctions regime had a number of demonstrable effects. It made it impossible for Hamas to deliver on its social and welfare promises. As a result, its rule appeared much inferior to Palestinian Authority rule in the West Bank, which lately has enjoyed the economic benefits of increased cooperation with Israel. Reports from Gaza suggested a simmering discontent with isolation and economic hardship. The sanctions also had symbolic value, by branding the Hamas regime as illegitimate.

Contrary to some Palestinian claims, the “lull” agreement did not provide for a lifting of the sanctions. It eased them, but only partially, and some imports, such as much-needed construction materials, continued to be banned altogether. It was in the hope of securing a new cease-fire, ending the sanctions altogether, that Hamas refused to renew the “lull” agreement and began firing rockets in December.

The lifting of sanctions has become the principal Hamas demand in the cease-fire negotiations. If Hamas can lift the sanctions, it will claim victory. It will argue that it broke the “siege” through “resistance”—albeit at a high cost—and that it effectively wrested economic control of Gaza’s frontiers from Israel. It will also claim that the lifting of the “blockade” constitutes de facto acceptance of Hamas rule in Gaza by both Israel and the international community.

Mediators operate by finding formulae that allow each side to claim some achievement. Lifting the “blockade” could well become the concession Israel will be asked to make to Hamas, especially since Israel hasn’t defined the continuation of sanctions as one of its declared goals. The concession will be urged upon Israel as a “humanitarian” measure by much of the international community, which will point to the urgent need for reconstruction.

After the military campaign is over, Israel’s control of Gaza’s economy will be its principal lever for translating its military achievements into political gains—above all, the continued degradation of Hamas control. Gaza will be desperate for all material things. Whoever controls their distribution will effectively control many aspects of daily life in Gaza.

This is a card Israel must be careful not to trade, either for a cease-fire or for international anti-smuggling cooperation on the Egypt-Gaza border. To that end, it must act now to affirm its adhesion to the sanctions. Israel should be willing to ease sanctions only if an international consortium for reconstruction is established, which has the legitimate Palestinian Authority as its sole agent within Gaza. In any cease-fire agreement, Israel should agree to open the crossings only to emergency food and medical aid—as it has during the fighting itself.

Ultimately, Operation Cast Lead will be judged not only by whether it produces an end to rocket fire—which it will—but whether it sets the stage for a shift of power within Gaza, away from Hamas “resistance”—a deceptive misnomer for Palestinian jihadism. This long-term goal should not be sacrificed to achieve short-term objectives.

This post originally appeared in the series On Second Thought, published by the Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies, Shalem Center, Jerusalem.

Shrinking Gaza

On By Martin Kramer

Last week, I was listening to a podcast of an interview with Professor Rashid Khalidi on a Chicago public radio station. I had downloaded it in great anticipation, and it got off to a great start. Khalidi, a Palestinian-American, is the Edward Said Professor at Columbia, editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies, author of a well-regarded book on Palestinian identity, and the man whom Obama said reminded him of “my own blind spots.” (He was never a PLO spokesman in Beirut—don’t believe anything you read by those people.) Khalidi was smoothly guiding me through the injustices inflicted on the Palestinians at his customarily rapid clip, and I felt I was in good hands. If you can’t believe what Rashid Khalidi says about Palestine… well, who can you believe?

And then, four minutes and twenty seconds into the interview, it happened. Khalidi was explaining how Israel knew “every inch” of Gaza. After all, he said, “the Gaza Strip is about ten or eleven miles by two.”

I spewed a mouthful of coffee all over my keyboard. The Gaza Strip is over six times larger than Khalidi’s “ten or eleven miles by two.” Not an order-of-magnitude mistake, but approaching one. Khalidi’s estimate would make Gaza four times more densely populated than Singapore (in fact, population density in Gaza is somewhere over half of Singapore’s). Did Khalidi think that was possible? I wondered. Perhaps it was a mere slip. But then, eight minutes and forty seconds into the interview, came this: Israel was using battlefield weapons “in the most heavily populated area on earth.”

No, not him too! Too many of my idols have been toppled! Juan Cole, who thought that Israel’s Jenin operation (April 2002) had provoked 9/11 (September 2001)… Joel Beinin, who insisted that $100 billion in total aid to Israel make a trillion… Sara Roy, who wrote that the average Gazan consumes half a ton of flour a day… So many champions of Palestine have been martyred by math and chronology! But Rashid Khalidi had been my rock—ever-reliable, academically impeccable.

Do I expect too much? “You can’t swing a cat in Gaza,” Rashid added. “You can’t throw a stone without hitting somebody.” I imagine this isn’t literally true. And if we allow this license for words, why not for numbers?

Why not?

Wikipedia: Gaza is about 41 kilometers (25 miles) long, and between 6 and 12 kilometers (4–7.5 miles) wide, with a total area of 360 square kilometers (139 square miles). Population: 1,500,202 (July 2008 est., CIA World Factbook).

Send your estimate of the population within the Gaza outline in any of the maps below, via the (moderated) comments.

Credit