American Colony Hotel

What Did (and Didn’t) Happen in Room 16 of the American Colony Hotel

By Martin Kramer

Mosaic Magazine, December 16, 2019

It’s said that the Oslo peace process was born in that room in Jerusalem in 1992. The truth is much different.

A couple of months ago, my wife and I took a 24-hour vacation in Jerusalem, spent entirely at the historic American Colony, one of Jerusalem’s oldest hostelries. The hotel originated in a messianic Christian commune whose members had arrived from Chicago toward the end of the 19th century in anticipation of the Second Coming. While waiting, they diversified into economic activities, including hospitality. Over the last century-plus, the American Colony has hosted an A-list of dignitaries and celebrities from T.E. Lawrence (“of Arabia”) to the British rock star Sting.

The hotel’s location, on the edge of the Arab downtown, has long facilitated its role as a neutral ground for meetings of Israelis and Palestinians; I’d dined there a few times in the distant past for just that reason. Today its old stone buildings remain charming and its many gardens enchanting—nowhere more so than where they conjoin around a bubbling fountain to form the enclosed patio of the main building.

Since ours was not a business trip but a holiday, to be devoted to rest and relaxation, the setting suited us just fine. To our delight, on check-in we received an upgrade to a suite: Room 16.

A bit of intrigue heightened our excitement. A year ago, the London Daily Mail had run a feature on “the ten best history-making hotel rooms.” It included, among others, Lenin’s room at the Hotel National in Moscow, the “Scandal Room” at the Watergate in Washington, and the Plaza Hotel suite that hosted the Beatles on their 1964 visit to New York. Tenth on the list was Room 16, “our” suite at the American Colony.

And what happened in that suite to merit such distinction? According to one telling of the story, a 1992 meeting in Room 16 was the first step in the “Oslo process” between Israel and the Palestinians that led to the accord signed at the White House in September 1993. “We concocted the start of what became the Oslo channel in Room 16 of the American Colony Hotel,” testifies Terje Rød-Larsen, the Norwegian mediator. “And the rest is history.”

Historians like myself dislike that expression, “the rest is history.” So I decided to test it.

Let’s travel back in time to mid-1992. The PLO leader Yasir Arafat is still stuck in Tunis, banished to the doghouse for having backed the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein after the latter’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. But in Washington, U.S.-sponsored talks between Israel and a West Bank-Gaza delegation—talks that exclude the PLO—seem just as stuck. Meanwhile, in Israel, elections appear likely to unseat the Likud and bring the Labor party to power under Yitzḥak Rabin and Shimon Peres.

A tight clique of Norwegian officials and activists thinks there might be an opening here. They’re sending out feelers to Israelis and Palestinians. On Friday, June 19, 1992, four persons meet in Room 16.

They are: Larsen, head of an NGO with ties to the Norwegian government; Yossi Beilin, protégé of Peres and soon to be deputy foreign minister of Israel; Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli academic who’s been nurturing ties with local Palestinian leaders; and Faisal Husseini, Arafat’s unofficial man in Jerusalem and an influential West Bank figure in his own right.

Of the figures in the room, Husseini enjoys the highest standing. The Los Angeles Times Magazine has just devoted a 6,500-word profile to this “Quiet Palestinian,” as the headline announces him, who is celebrated as “a pivotal player in the search for peace.” The article explains that Husseini hails from Jerusalem’s most notable Arab family. His grandfather and great-grandfather were mayors of Jerusalem; his father was a Palestinian hero, killed while commanding Arab irregulars who had encircled Jewish Jerusalem in 1948. Husseini is also the grand-nephew of the notorious pro-Nazi Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini.

The Washington Post, for its part, has described Husseini as “conspicuous in adopting more moderate positions than the PLO leadership in Tunis.” In that capacity, he has functioned as the key Palestinian figure behind the scenes of the ongoing Washington talks between Israel and the West Bank-Gaza delegation as well as the public point man in negotiations with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. He has been characterized by Edward Said, the Columbia professor and the most prestigious Palestinian in America, as “an unaffected, unintellectual man whom it is impossible not to like,… a born leader.” The New York Times will later describe him as “the only leader in the West Bank or Gaza… considered to be on a par with the outsiders, those [with Arafat] in Tunis.” Some even dare to speak of him as a possible successor to Arafat.

As for the meeting in Room 16, it’s important to know what it isn’t. It’s not, for instance, the first time Husseini has met Beilin. To the contrary, they’ve known each other for over a decade. Husseini also knows Hirschfeld perfectly well, and in fact has even met more than once with Shimon Peres. Israelis seek him out because, although an ardent Palestinian nationalist, he talks about a two-state solution and condemns terrorism. It also helps that he speaks Hebrew, acquired during three years of on-and-off detention.

The new factor in the mix is Larsen, the Norwegian facilitator. Everyone outside the room thinks the road to peace leads exclusively through Washington. Larsen’s message: Norway could provide a discreet “back channel,” not to circumvent Washington but to supplement it.

Here now is Beilin recounting later what transpired in Room 16:

Husseini reviewed the state of the Washington talks as they currently stood, and it became clear that there had been no progress worth speaking of. He turned to the idea of the secret track proposed by Larsen, and commended it. He also expressed the hope that Rabin would indeed be the next prime minister and it would be possible to reach agreement with the minimum of delay, using a “laboratory” to be located in Oslo.

There you have it: evidence that the “Oslo process” began in Room 16. Or did it, really? Beilin continues:

This was an excellent meeting, but it was one which led nowhere: these four participants, who had agreed to work together to support the official political process, were never to meet again in the same configuration. The eventual “laboratory” was quite different from what was… designed in the American Colony.

How would that future configuration differ? The Oslo “laboratory” would include three of the four participants: Larsen, Beilin, and Hirschfeld. But Faisal Husseini would be cut out, and along with him the Palestinians of the West Bank and Jerusalem. He would be replaced by a PLO man and Arafat sidekick: Ahmad Qurei, a.k.a. Abu Ala, who’d never met an Israeli in his life. And the Oslo back channel wouldn’t support “the official process,” i.e., the Washington talks. It would bypass them altogether.

Husseini himself would play a role in making sure he would be bypassed. In October 1992, he gave Abu Ala “the first hint” that Israelis close to Peres wanted to engage with the PLO. “At the time I did not pay the matter much attention,” recalled Abu Ala, “but when I met Faisal Husseini again, in November 1992, he repeated his suggestion.”

Husseini also admitted encouraging the Israelis to meet with Abu Ala: “Mr. Hirschfeld came to me and asked me, ‘Who is Abu Ala? Do you know this person Abu Ala? Is he good?’ I said, ‘Yes, he is good, call him.’” Husseini probably didn’t think much would come of it. He and his close associate, the West Bank activist Hanan Ashrawi, reached their high mark in December during an Oval Office meeting and photo-op with President George H.W. Bush.

But in January 1993 Israel and the PLO opened the secret Oslo channel. As soon as they did, Abu Ala worked to cut out Husseini and keep him in the dark. And in this he succeeded. When Hirschfeld tried to reinsert Husseini into the picture, Abu Ala warned that doing so would “undermine the position of the PLO” (his words). And so it went, as a close associate of Husseini would later explain:

Whenever Hirschfeld made attempts to approach Husseini, Ashrawi, or any other Palestinian activist from inside the territories to pass a message or to comment on an issue, the PLO threatened the Israeli team to freeze the contacts or halt the talks.

There’s some evidence that Husseini got a whiff of the secret track, but he certainly wasn’t part of it. The Oslo agreement landed on him as a surprise.

I could end my inquiry right here. The claim for Room 16 put forward by Larsen, and by the American Colony itself, doesn’t hold water. Patently false is its most extravagant version, elaborated some years ago by the hotel’s (Israeli) CFO presumably to enhance the mystique of the establishment. Room 16, he said,

was the venue where Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres’s assistants, and sometimes they as well, met Faisal Husseini and his assistants to negotiate the Oslo peace agreement. Of course the public agreement was signed in Oslo, but all of the negotiations leading up to it, for a period of five or six months before it, were in Room 16, which was kept as a secret.

This is obviously untrue: none of the negotiations over the terms of the accord took place in Room 16. But even the more modest claim—that Oslo was somehow conceived there—is groundless. In the many memoirs of Oslo, only Beilin mentions (and as we’ve seen, dismisses) the one meeting. Hirschfeld doesn’t mention it at all.

In fact, the real significance of Room 16 lies not in its alleged place in the run-up to the Oslo agreement but in its role leading down to the “road not taken”: namely, the road to an agreement between Israel and the so-called “inside” leadership of the West Bank and Gaza, personified by Faisal Husseini, that would have bypassed the PLO.

On this matter, the conventional view is that such a road, if it existed at all, was a dead end, since the “inside” leaders were themselves paralyzed by their subservience to the PLO. Yet Arafat certainly didn’t think so. In fact, right through the Oslo process, he remained obsessed by the prospect that he might lose the initiative to Husseini. Although Hirschfeld thought that Husseini was loyal to Arafat, Arafat himself “remained suspicious and did almost everything he could to undermine Husseini’s authority,” even by summoning him to Tunis for dressings-down.

At the same time, Arafat ordered Husseini to take intransigent positions in the Washington talks in order to ensure their failure. As an Israeli delegate to those talks later lamented, “Arafat was pushing us to negotiate directly with the PLO in Oslo by stonewalling [us] in Washington.” Arafat explained his reasoning to an associate: if Husseini’s team were to reach an agreement with Israel, “the Americans and the world community will consider them an alternative to the PLO. They will replace us and we will have to leave the party, without getting a single crumb.”

Nor, as it turns out, was this a groundless apprehension on Arafat’s part. As late as June 1993, Prime Minister Rabin thought to pull the plug on Oslo and swing back to Husseini. He had a lingering hope that Husseini would stand up straight and would, in the words of U.S. negotiator Martin Indyk, “reject Arafat’s leadership and strike a deal on autonomy.”

The PLO, Rabin observed in a “top secret” memo to Peres that June, was “an extremist element” that was “preventing the more moderate elements from making progress in the negotiations with us” in Washington:

It’s not unlikely that the Tunis people want to scuttle any chance to have meaningful negotiations with us in Washington, and compel us to talk only to them…. I request that these contacts be halted until further clarification.

As the Oslo critic Efraim Karsh has written, Rabin’s preference here “made eminent sense,” since the “inside” leaders had “a far more realistic and less extreme perspective” than the PLO.

This was perhaps the last moment when the train could have been switched back from the “outside” PLO track to the “inside” track. Indeed, the Rabin letter sent Peres and his team reeling. But then, although no knows for certain why, Rabin quickly reversed himself. Perhaps he never overcame his doubts about Husseini: too nice a guy to crush Hamas, and too timid to defy Arafat. On top of that, Husseini was actually less flexible than the PLO when it came to the status of Jerusalem. Or perhaps it was all a matter of domestic politics and Rabin mainly wanted to avoid an open clash with Peres.

In any event, the prime minister lifted his temporary hold on Oslo, and Israeli negotiations with Arafat’s men in Norway entered high gear, culminating in the September handshake on the White House lawn. The rush to agreement also skipped a stage envisioned by Beilin and his team. The original plan, according to Beilin, was for the agreement to receive prior approval in the secret track and then be turned over to the Americans who “would conduct shuttle diplomacy between Husseini and Rabin, leading rapidly to agreement between the two and subsequently to public signing of the documents.”

But that didn’t happen: Husseini was never brought into the loop, even in the final stage, and Rabin, instead of shaking Husseini’s hand on the White House lawn, wound up shaking Arafat’s.

When the news of Oslo burst, the Israeli journalist Pinhas Inbari caught a glimpse of Husseini in Orient House, the family-owned Jerusalem headquarters from which he operated. For what it may be worth, this is what Inbari reported:

I passed by the office of Faisal Husseini. This man, who had always been surrounded by people, sat utterly alone in the big and empty room, left to himself. There were tears in his eyes. He didn’t cry, but he looked as though his world had collapsed. He was the senior man in the delegation to Washington. He’d had a chance to sign an agreement with Israel, without the PLO, and he’d missed it. He didn’t dare. Perhaps he thought, mistakenly, that Israel would never go with the PLO. It was a huge blow to him. But it’s possible that fear of Arafat defeated him, and he gave up.

Arafat didn’t invite Husseini to the White House ceremony, and he didn’t think to go. But the Americans prevailed on him to attend. “His gloomy countenance in the back rows of the guests,” wrote Inbari, “gave away his dissatisfaction.”

Husseini never wrote his memoirs, but Ashrawi wrote hers, and in them she conveys something of the same despair, leavened with fear. She records that when she later complained about the Oslo terms to Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), his response was to chide her. “It’s your fault,” said Abu Mazen. “I had asked you to start secret talks in Jerusalem and you refused.” Her reply: “You know perfectly well why we could not do that. Without Abu Ammar’s [Arafat’s] approval, it would have been political suicide. Now I say maybe you were right. We should have done it.”

Could Husseini have done it? It’s an imponderable. Edward Said once wrote that without Arafat, Husseini would likely not have enjoyed whatever authority he had on the West Bank. Nor was his aristocratic lineage as powerful a credential as many outsiders believed. One American diplomat even called it an “obstacle, especially among young radical Palestinians who believed that the time of the old families and ‘notables’ had come and gone.”

Still, in 1992, a show of boldness by staking out a position independent of Arafat might have been rewarded. There might have been Israeli interest, American backing, and Saudi funding. Instead, by the time Husseini did display some gumption—he had a stormy confrontation with Arafat in mid-1993—it was already too late.

Oslo soon opened the gates of Palestine to Arafat and the PLO outsiders, who flooded in, sweeping Husseini (and Ashrawi) aside. The new regime did give him a sinecure as its representative in Jerusalem, but never admitted him to the ruling inner circle. When the two men were speaking at all, Arafat, now in the saddle, let Husseini cool his heels for hours in the waiting room. There were mutual accusations of financial improprieties.

In a last interview with an Egyptian newspaper before his death, Husseini surprised Israelis, and clouded his legacy, by reportedly asserting that Oslo was a “Trojan horse” intended to advance the “long-term goal, which is the liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea.” In fact he’d said similar things even to American audiences, but with the edges softened. Still, it was a statement rife with bitter irony—not only because Arafat’s Trojan horse had crushed Husseini, too, but also because Arafat reportedly once called Husseini himself a Trojan horse for a larger strategic plan to “cancel out” and “liquidate” the PLO.

In 2001, at the age of sixty, Husseini dropped dead of a heart attack while on a mission to repair the once-close relations with Kuwait that Arafat had wrecked through his close association with Saddam Hussein. Israel permitted a mass funeral with a huge cortege to pass from Ramallah to Jerusalem with Palestinian flags flying.

Faisal Husseini lies buried in the same grave as his “martyred” father, south of the Aqsa mosque and abutting the Western Wall. Today, except for the fact that the soccer stadium of the Palestinian national team carries his name, most young Palestinians probably have little idea who Faisal Husseini was. And aside from Ashrawi and from Husseini’s own son, who annually mark his death, no one does much to memorialize him. On the occasions when he is remembered, he is called the “Prince of Jerusalem,” and a small foundation is devoted to his legacy.

I didn’t sleep well in Room 16. At the patio restaurant, I’d indulged in a spicy dish and too much cabernet. No doubt my slumber was also disturbed by the building’s many ghosts, some of them lurking the corridors since Ottoman times.

But perhaps the most restless spirit of them all belongs to Faisal Husseini, the man who missed his moment. Twenty-seven years ago, his opportunity knocked on the door of Room 16. One can only wonder where the Palestinians and Israel would be today had he seized it.

About the Author

Martin Kramer is a historian at Tel Aviv University and the Walter P. Stern fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He served as founding president at Shalem College in Jerusalem.

(And as a special bonus for my subscribers, go here for a look inside Room 16. The lovely woman is my wife.)

The fantasy of an international Jerusalem

This article first appeared at Mosaic Magazine, here.

In the uproar over President Trump’s announcement of U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, one constant refrain has been the insistence that, by longstanding international consensus, the city’s status has yet to be decided. In the portentous words of the recent UN General Assembly resolution protesting the American action, “Jerusalem is a final-status issue to be resolved through negotiations in line with relevant United Nations resolutions.”

The most “relevant” of those prior resolutions was the November 1947 resolution proposing partition of Palestine and envisaging, in addition to two independent states, one Arab and one Jewish, an entirely separate status for Jerusalem as a city belonging to no state but instead administered by a “special international regime.”

One might have thought that the wholesale Arab rejection of the entire partition plan, in all of its parts, would also have put paid to the idea of an internationalized Jerusalem. Evidently, however, this fantasy is too convenient to lie dormant forever.

That is why it’s useful to know that, almost exactly three decades before the 1947 UN plan, internationalization of Jerusalem was killed—and killed decisively. Who killed it? Thereby hangs a tale, but here is a hint: it was neither the Arabs, nor the Jews.

• •

Two-and-a-half weeks ago, Jerusalem marked the 100th anniversary of the surrender of the city to British General Edmund Allenby. On December 11, 1917, Allenby crowned his military success in wresting Jerusalem from the Ottoman Turks and their German ally in a ceremony that resonates to this day.

In a show of seeming humility, Allenby entered the city’s Jaffa Gate on foot, without flags or musical fanfare. Mounting the platform at the entrance to the Citadel (the Tower of David), he then read a straightforward proclamation: the city would be placed under martial law, and the status quo in regard to the holy places would remain in place. After shaking hands with a selection of Jerusalem’s notables, he departed, having spent all of a quarter-hour in the city.

The Illustrated London News carried a photograph, later famous, of Allenby striding on foot into Jerusalem; it depicted the scene as the conqueror’s “simple and reverent entry into Jerusalem.” In fact, the photo op had been carefully stage-managed to create a propaganda point against the German enemy. Kaiser Wilhelm II, upon visiting Jerusalem in 1898, had entered on a white steed, banners flying. So, three weeks before Allenby arrived there, he received this instruction from his superior, General William Robertson, chief of the imperial general staff:

In the event of JERUSALEM being occupied, it would be of considerable political importance if you, on officially entering the city, dismount at the city gate and enter on foot. German emperor rode in and the saying went ’round [that] “a better man than he walked.” Advantage of contrast in conduct will be obvious.

It was obvious indeed, and well-documented in British propaganda photos and films. This is why, even now, the victors’ procession and Allenby’s declaration take pride of place in the memory of that December 1917 day. Two weeks ago in the Old City of Jerusalem, before an enthusiastic audience of hundreds, both the procession and the proclamation were reenacted.

But another event also took place on that same day in 1917, away from the cameras but just as noteworthy. Indeed, that second event offers the best explanation for why internationalization of Jerusalem never stood a chance in 1947, or at any time since.

When Jerusalem fell, the secret Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916 was still in force. That agreement, for the partition of the Ottoman empire, had been reached by the major Allied powers: Britain, France, and Russia. Because of the October Revolution, just weeks before Jerusalem’s capture, Russia had dropped out, but that still left Britain and France (as well as Italy, which jumped late into the alliance).

Since Britain and France both laid claim to Palestine, and wanted to forestall a clash in advance of its conquest, they had decided to share it. By agreement, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and the zone between them were to have an “international administration,” the form of which would be decided through Allied consultation. Sykes-Picot was thus the very first plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem.

But as the war progressed in Palestine, British imperial forces did nearly all of the fighting and dying in battle against the Turks. Lloyd George, the British prime minister, recoiled at the idea of sharing a British conquest with the French. In April 1917, he told the British ambassador to Paris that “the French will have to accept our protectorate; we shall be there by conquest and shall remain.”

The French, however, were just as determined to assert their rights under the Sykes-Picot accord. And so, when the victors’ procession entered Jerusalem on December 11, not only did it include a small French military contingent. It included François Georges-Picot, the French diplomat who had negotiated the agreement.

Picot had just been named by his government as “High Commissioner of the French Republic in the Occupied Territories of Palestine and Syria.” He also had precise instructions from the French prime minister: “You will have to organize the occupied territories so as to ensure France an equal footing to that of England.” In November 1917, Picot proceeded to remind Allenby’s political officer, Brigadier General Gilbert Clayton, of these facts.

“[O]ver a year ago,” Clayton would report Picot as saying, “it was agreed between the British and French governments that, pending the final settlement of the peace terms, any conquered portions of Palestine should be jointly administered.” Moreover, Clayton added, Picot himself operated “in the full conviction that he was to be the French representative in a joint Anglo-French provisional administration which was to govern occupied enemy territory in Palestine until the end of the war—when some sort of international arrangement would be made.”

That is why Picot had set off for Jerusalem on the coattails of Allenby’s victorious army. But Allenby also had his orders. Chief of Staff Robertson had instructed him two weeks earlier that he must “not entertain any ideas of joint administration.” The way around the French was to keep Jerusalem and the rest of the country under a military regime as long as the war lasted. Since Allenby was the commander-in-chief, military rule meant Allenby’s own rule, exercised through any military governors he might appoint.

And that’s just what Allenby announced in his famous proclamation on the steps of the Tower of David. Jerusalem, he told the assembled crowd, had been occupied “by my forces. I therefore here and now proclaim it to be under Martial Law, under which form of administration it will remain so long as military considerations make it necessary.”

But just what did this mean? And did it exclude the French? After the ceremony adjourned in Jerusalem, Allenby, Picot, and the other chief participants retired to lunch at military headquarters just outside the city, near Ein Karem. Major T.E. Lawrence (that is, “Lawrence of Arabia”) attended as well, having come up from Aqaba at Allenby’s bidding. In his memoir Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence described the scene:

On us fell a short space of quiet, to be shattered by Monsieur Picot, the French political representative permitted by Allenby to march beside Clayton in the entry, who said in his fluting voice: “And tomorrow, my dear general, I will take the necessary steps to set up civil government in this town.”

It was the bravest word on record; a silence followed, as when they opened the seventh seal in heaven. Salad, chicken mayonnaise, and foie-gras sandwiches hung in our wet mouths unmunched, while we turned to Allenby and gaped. Even he seemed for the moment at a loss. We began to fear that the idol might betray a frailty. But his face grew red: he swallowed, his chin coming forward (in the way we loved), whilst he said, grimly, “In the military zone the only authority is that of the commander-in-chief—myself.” “But Sir Grey, Sir Edward Grey . . . ,” stammered M. Picot. [Grey, by that time Lord Grey, had been British foreign secretary in 1916, when the Sykes-Picot agreement was concluded.] He was cut short. “Sir Edward Grey referred to the civil government which will be established when I judge that the military situation permits.”

It is widely acknowledged that Lawrence’s reliability as a witness to events out in the desert leaves much to be desired. But this episode occurred on Allenby’s side of the Jordan, and in the presence of other British officers. His account, then, however colorfully phrased, may be regarded as trustworthy.

Indeed, Lawrence may even have softened the edges. Philip Chetwode, commander of a corps in Palestine, also attended the lunch; in a 1939 letter to another officer who had been there, and who was writing a biography of Allenby, Chetwode wrote:

I wish to goodness you could put in what the Frenchman said to Allenby and what Allenby said to him, when the Frenchman said he was going to take over the civil administration of Jerusalem at once. However, that, of course, can never appear in a book.

Since a version had already appeared in Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the bit of Allenby’s put-down that could “never appear in a book” might well have been gruffer still. (Louis Massignon, a French officer attached to Picot, wrote that “Allenby threatened Picot harshly with arrest if he interfered.”)

This didn’t exhaust Picot’s efforts, but the die had been cast. Ten days later, Picot complained that there had been no progress toward “Anglo-French civil administration,” and told a British interlocutor that “he would never have agreed to come out [to Palestine] if he had known.” Although Picot’s French Commission tried to (re)assert a “religious protectorate” over Catholic holy places (mostly in opposition to the Italians), there would be no “international administration” in Jerusalem, only exclusive British control.

Moreover, while Allenby had invoked military necessity, the British soon developed a full-blown thesis as to why they, and only they, were qualified to rule Jerusalem. The British, they averred in brief, were purely neutral. As Lloyd George put it, “being of no particular faith [we are] the only power fit to rule Mohammedans, Jews, Roman Catholics, and all religions.”

• •

Thus did the first agreement to internationalize Jerusalem come to naught.

Why is this significant today? Had Allenby wavered, and had some sort of joint administration come into being after World War I, it might have created institutions of international governance. These might have accumulated 30 years of experience by 1947, when the United Nations recommended the partition of Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem. Instead, during those decades, the British preferred to rule Jerusalem exactly as the Ottomans had done before them—namely, by dictate.

In 1947, internationalization thus had no precedent, no bureaucratic foundation, and no mechanism for implementation. As in 1916, it wasn’t a true option, but a placeholder for indecision.

In the century since Allenby entered Jerusalem, the city hasn’t known a single day of international administration. Indeed, it hasn’t had such a day in 3,000 years. The idea that it constitutes a kind of default solution for the future of Jerusalem is but one more example of a petrified piety. Internationalization became irrelevant over lunch a century ago, and it has remained so ever since.

A Franciscan monk reads a French translation of Gen. Edmund Allenby's proclamation putting Jerusalem under martial law, December 11, 1917. Allenby at center; François Georges-Picot, on far right.

Image: A Franciscan monk reads a French translation of Gen. Edmund Allenby’s proclamation putting Jerusalem under martial law, December 11, 1917. Allenby at center; François Georges-Picot, on far right. Matson Collection, Library of Congress.

The metal detectors of Islam

Bauernfeind, entrance to Temple MountIsrael has capitulated over the metal detectors (and surveillance cameras) that it installed last week at the entrances to the Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif. As anyone familiar with the long history of the “status quo” in Jerusalem knows, the “crisis” is wholly manufactured, and is but the latest chapter in a fifty-year Israeli-Palestinian struggle over sovereign authority.

The Palestinian aim has been to expand the autonomous administration of the Haram ash-Sharif, permitted them in 1967, and turn the esplanade into an extra-territorial enclave by leveraging Israeli and international fears of a wider conflagration. In this long-term campaign, they have had much success, and the latest “crisis” has produced yet another Palestinian “victory.”

The episode has raised the question of just what constitutes legitimate security measures at Islamic holy shrines and iconic mosques. We live in a time when the primary threat to the security of these sites arises from Muslims themselves—notably, extremists bent on using them as launching pads for violent acts designed to destabilize and terrorize. Across the Muslim world, governments are acutely aware of the vulnerabilities of these sites, and have taken measures to secure them. In particular, they have resorted to a very commonplace technology: metal detectors.

At this link, I provide some prime examples, from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. How do these states differ from Israel? They are effective and sole sovereigns over the holy shrines and major mosques in their territory. Israel apparently is not.

“The Metal Detectors of Islam,” here, for a quick trip to Islam’s bucket list of top sites. Please place your keys and camera in the basket.