THE MECCAN CONGRESS of June-July 1926 was convened in response to several invitations from “Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud (1880-1953), issued over a period of two years. Ibn Sa‘ud made his initial appeal in the midst of his controversial Hijazi campaign of conquest, at a time when he was still regarded by many Muslims beyond Arabia as an intolerant sectarian. Hence the response of those invited—Muslim states and associations—was slow in coming and eventually incomplete. The congress, as described in the earlier versions of the invitation, was to have determined the future form of government for the Hijaz, and in this manner Ibn Sa‘ud aspired to cast himself as trustee rather than conqueror. But following the fall of Mecca, Madina, and Jidda to Ibn Sa‘ud’s arms, his acclamation as King of the Hijaz by the notables of the province left little to be determined in the matter of government. The projected agenda thus was reduced to discussion of means to improve the conditions of the pilgrimage, with the transparent aim of securing formal Muslim acquiescence in the newly installed régime.

Resistance to such acquiescence was fairly widespread. The war that raged in the holy cities and their vicinity had generated much talk in India of an international régime for the Hijaz similar to that proposed by Kawakibi in his Umm al-qura; the disorder in Arabia had encouraged the revival of latent Egyptian territorial ambitions directed toward the Hijaz. The tensions which lay beneath the preparation, proceedings, and aftermath of the congress thus stemmed from the dispute among Muslims over Saudi measures to assure permanence of rule over the province and the cities of pilgrimage. The congress met once, adopted a charter and a set of resolutions, and dispersed with the intention of reconvening the following year. But the participants were never summoned back.

But over the years, reminiscences and letters of participants were published, revealing more thoroughly an inner dimension of the congress. The posthumously published “memoirs” of Shaykh Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, chief of the Egyptian delegation to the congress and later rector of al-Azhar, represented a major corrective to accounts based on the public record, for they reflected the depth of conflict in the congress sessions.³ An important retrospective appraisal of the congress from a Saudi point of view was provided by Hafiz Wahba, adviser to Ibn Sa‘ud and principal organizer of the congress, who also conceded that the congress was marked by intense controversy.⁴ Also revealing were Rashid Rida’s letters to Shakib Arslan, compiled in Mecca during the congress.⁵ Written from another perspective were the recollections of ‘Ajaj Nuwayhid, a Lebanese Druze from Palestine, who acted both as participant and interpreter at the congress.⁶ Of limited use were the odd accounts of Iqbal ‘Ali Shah, an Indo-Afghan publicist of uncertain allegiance and the father of Sufi proselytizer Idries Shah. He attended the congress as an observer and spied on the Russian Muslim delegation for the British vice consul in Jidda.⁷

Governments with an interest in the congress also collected informed accounts, and the dispatches of the British vice consul in Jidda, S. R. Jordan, contained much confidential information on the factions within the congress.⁸ More candid than any previous accounts of these factions were undoubtedly the secret reports to King Fu’ad of Egypt, written by members of the Egyptian delegation immediately upon their return from Mecca, and by the Egyptian consul in Jidda.⁹

On April 28, 1926, Ibn Sa‘ud telegraphed invitations to various Muslim rulers and associations, urging them to attend a Meccan Muslim congress

for the service of the two holy sanctuaries and their inhabitants, to secure their future, to increase the means of comfort for pilgrims and visitors, to improve the holy lands in all respects which all the Muslims in general care for, to fulfill our promises we made and with a view to our wish to see the Muslims cooperating in serving these holy lands¹⁰

This was a reiteration of long-standing invitation which only one Indian Muslim society had accepted.¹¹ But the congress proposal had taken on a new urgency for Ibn Sa‘ud, because in January 1926 he had been acclaimed king by the notables of the subjugated province. The step had betrayed his ambition, and had abrogated the pledge which he had given in the past to involve the wider Muslim world in determining the political future of the Hijaz. Now he sought recognition of the accomplished fact of his kingship.

He and his advisers thus opened a campaign to secure participants for a Muslim congress under Saudi auspices, scheduled for June 1926. This time the invitations had a much greater effect, for Ibn Sa‘ud was now ruler of the holy cities, recognized by the Western powers and responsible for the conduct of the pilgrimage. So began the modern transformation by which the Saudis were to shed their association with schismatic fanaticism, and become for many Muslims the sole keepers of the orthodox flame.

The stages of preparation and deliberation overlapped, for the organizers continued to draw delegations and reiterate invitations even after the opening of the congress. Ibn Sa‘ud had originally hoped that the official representatives of Muslim states would predominate in the congress. But when the first session opened, in a former Turkish barrack, not one official delegation was present from beyond Arabia. Participants represented a number of Muslim associations, some more important than others, or attended in their personal capacities. Only a week later did an official Yemeni delegation arrive, and after the congress recessed for the pilgrimage rites, three other official delegations arrived, from Egypt, Turkey, and Afghanistan. The organizers welcomed the presence of these delegations as an achievement, although the combination of official and unofficial delegations proved unwieldy. “In political questions, the congress was divided into two halves,” wrote Shaykh Zawahiri in his secret report. “In the first were the representatives of independent governments, of conservative disposition, and in the second were representatives of peoples, of hotheaded disposition.¹²

The animated judgments of Shaykh Zawahiri throw much new light on the composition of the congress. Of the unofficial participants, he was most impressed by the representatives of the Indian Khilafat Committee. The delegation was led by two brothers, Muhammad and Shawkat ‘Ali, who once had spoken for the largest and best organized of Muslim political associations.¹³ They were originally supportive of Ibn Sa‘ud in his war against Husayn of Mecca, whose Arab rebellion against the Ottoman caliph they had regarded as treasonable. But as the Saudi occupation of the Hijaz wore on, a reaction set in.

They were collectively opposed to the government of Ibn Sa‘ud and the Wahhabis in the Hijaz, although an unheeded minority among them sided with the Wahhabis. The most noticeable leaders among the Indians were Muhammad “Ali; Shawkat ‘Ali; and Shu‘ayb Qurashi, a lawyer educated in England and a moving speaker. Shaykh [Sulayman] al-Nadwi is a calm and self-possessed “alim. .. . The first three carried out harsh and relentless assaults against the government of Ibn Sa‘ud and criticized his administrative and religious policy. They are generally men of emotion more than men of thought, and their religious emotion is like steampower which, when controlled by someone wise, will generate great things. They hold affection for Egypt, but detest the English occupation. Were it not for this, they would have bound all their hopes to Egypt. I spoke with Muhammad ‘Ali about the hopes of the Indians and the Islamic revival, and he said that all their hopes were riding on the Turks, but that the Turks had frustrated them. When Ibn Sa‘ud’s movement had arisen, they turned their hopes toward him, but when they came to Mecca and saw what they saw, he let them down also.¹⁴

One of the delegates, Shu‘ayb Qurashi, had been present in the Hijaz as representative of the Indian Khilafat Committee when Ibn Sa‘ud had been proclaimed king. In his wounded reaction to this sudden development, confided to an Indian friend in an intercepted letter, Qurashi vented the resentment which later animated the Committee’s delegation:¹⁵ “friend Ibne Sa‘ud got himself proclaimed King of Hedjaz yesterday. Of course it was at the repeated request of Hejazis. There was a bayat, a promise to act according to the book and the Sunnah. There may also be created a Legislative Assembly for Hedjaz. But all this is bunkum. The whole show was got up. It was a prearranged plan. The Hejazis do not want him. I have ascertained their views first hand. . . . Of course we can protest, but the real decision will have to be taken by the Committee in India.” The Khilafat Committee eventually agreed to join the congress despite the failure of Ibn Sa‘ud to respond to their concerns, but the delegation was determined to cause a stir and perhaps win the Khilafat Committee some say in the administration of the Hijaz.

The Javanese delegation was also of considerable importance, led as it was by Umar Sayyid Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934), a scion of an aristocratic Javanese family and a former native administrator. Leader of the Sarekat Islam, a large movement that claimed a membership in the millions, he had declined an invitation to the Cairo caliphate congress in favor of the Meccan congress. But the Javanese did not impress Zawahiri: ‘They are a weak people in every matter. They were like a grasping, drowning person, wishing to find something to support them, and able to move neither hand nor tongue. They did not say a word, and avoided any commitment.” That they were silent was born out by the record.¹⁶ Of the Syrians and Palestinians, foremost among them the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, Zawahiri had this to say: “They caused a great stir with their immature opinions. All that interested them was, first, to appear on the stage in any possible manner, and second, to protest what was happening in their own country and ask for aid.” No more constructive were the Soviet Muslim delegates, who lacked self-confidence. They “had the feeling that the other nations accused them of atheism and Bolshevism. They proclaimed their innocence on every occasion, and it seemed that they were not among the leaders of their country, because they tried to avoid any commitment.¹⁷ From the Sudan came two persons who frankly admitted to the Egyptian delegation that they had arrived as simple pilgrims, and never claimed to represent anybody.¹⁸

The Arabian delegations, whether from Najd, “Asir, or the Hijaz, were Saudi-controlled. Of the Hijazis, Zawahiri wrote that “they are simple souls. There were those among them who did not hide their moaning about the Najdis; then there were Beduin shaykhs who did not understand what was going on, and they assembled with a group of Najdis as representatives of the Hijaz.” Before the arrival of the official Egyptian delegation, Egypt was spoken for by Shaykh Muhammad Madi Abu al-‘Aza’im, who played a leading role in the domestic opposition to the Cairo caliphate congress that had just drawn to a close (see previous chapter). Abu al-‘Aza’im had acted in Egypt as a Saudi apologist and went so far as to claim the caliphate for Ibn Sa‘ud.¹⁹ The most prominent delegate present in a private capacity was Rashid Rida, editor of al-Manar, who long had advocated precisely this sort of congress. Zawahiri wrote of him that

he supports Ibn Sa‘ud with the pen, so that one Hijazi said: Ibn Sa‘ud claims that he took the Hijaz with his sword, but Shaykh Rashid claims that it was taken by the pen. He was the object of suspicion among the Indians and others, and Muhammad ‘Ali told me that Shaykh Rashid took from Ibn Sa‘ud about £6,000. When I mentioned this to Shaykh Hafiz [Wahba], he said: There is money in this affair. Muhammad “Ali said to Rashid Rida in jest: Be quiet and I will pay you²⁰

In a private letter, Rida himself put Ibn Sa‘ud’s contribution to his work at £4,000.²¹ The Egyptian consul and British vice consul both put the sum at £2,000.²² When open rumors began to circulate about this connection a year later, Rida wrote a lengthy defensive polemic on patronage.²³

Such was the composition of the congress during the pre-pilgrimage stage. The Saudi-controlled delegations, enjoying the active support of Rashid Rida, soon clashed with the Indian Khilafat Committee delegation. The former were at an advantage owing to the composition of the remaining delegations, in which their own chosen sympathizers predominated.

In the post-pilgrimage stage of the congress, following the arrival of the official delegations, the balance shifted only slightly. The Turkish delegation, according to Zawahiri, remained aloof: “I learned from another quarter that the Turks had decided to participate in the congress before the settlement of the Mosul question, to execute a political maneuver. When they came to an agreement [with the British] over Mosul, they refused to turn back in disorder, and so sent a token delegation. This was clear from the work of the delegation. It avoided all political or financial commitment.²⁴ The Turkish delegate told the British vice consul that “he had been sent by the Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha with a watching brief only.²⁵ The Afghan delegate, a diplomat posted to Ankara, was “like the shadow” of the Turkish delegate.²⁶ For the Yemeni delegate, a relative of the Imam Yahya who arrived in Mecca with a large retinue of retainers and slaves, the congress was apparently an opportunity to settle bilateral issues with Ibn Sa‘ud, and he played no role in the congress. “It seems improbable that a Governor of a coastal town in Arabia [Hudayda] would travel with twenty or more armed retainers and make so much show for the pleasure of proceeding to Mecca ostensibly to take part in a conference for which he might easily have been too late.²⁷ Only the official Egyptian delegation, headed by Zawahiri, added its voice to that of the Indian Khilafat Committee’s delegation, in constituting a rudimentary bloc of opposition. As a precondition of entry into the hall, the Egyptians insisted on the expulsion of Abu al-‘Aza’im, and he was forced out despite his protests.

Ibn Sa‘ud’s more vociferous opponents were absent from the congress altogether, Iraq’s King Faysal was invited, but would not take part in any gathering organized by the Saudi archrival. More telling was Iran’s refusal to send a representative, a decision rooted in the legacy of Wahhabi-Shi‘i animosity. An Iranian delegation, led by Iran’s consul-general in Damascus, did arrive in Cairo in order to proceed to the congress by Red Sea steamer. But they paused in Egypt as higher consultations took place between Teheran and Iran’s minister to Cairo. Finally the Iranian government decided against any participation; Iran’s prime minister pronounced that “the Persian Government is unable to stand by and view unconcernedly the actions of a small band of bigots who are engaged in endeavouring to force their opinions on the Mohammadan world.” Iran demanded the creation of a general assembly of Muslims to regulate the holy shrines, and called on all Muslims “not [to] permit any further humiliating insults to be heaped on their sanctuaries and their faith.²⁸ This was the most important abstention.

To avoid any charge of interference, Ibn Sa‘ud himself did not attend the congress, aside from an initial appearance to the salute of twenty-one guns. “The explosions were so loud and so shook the building that several delegates became panicky and left the building, fearing it was about to collapse.²⁹ But on this occasion, Ibn Sa‘ud did inform the participants that they were not to discuss the domestic or international policies of any state, a constraint that several of his listeners regarded as insufferable and were prepared to ignore.³⁰

For the evidence categorically contradicts Toynbee’s assertion that political and religious controversy “was not the outstanding feature of the Mecca congress,” and that the issues of improved public administration and pilgrimage arrangements were “non-contentious.”³¹ Zawahiri’s published memoirs bring out the conflicts quite clearly, while in his secret report, he provides an even more candid version:

The first days of the congress passed, and the organizers were in sweet dreams (ahlam ladhidha), and they imagined that everything was going in their favor. But this did not last long. The congress especially took up issues of their pretended leadership, like the question of religious tolerance, and the question of criticism of the government’s administration and organization. It became clear that the congress was moving toward the creation of an international body which would oversee the government of the Hijaz and hold it to account. At the same time, they were not getting from the congress a single dirham, nor recognition of the legality of their rule in the Hijaz. To the contrary, they heard debate which held that they were not fit to rule the Hijaz. Not one of the Indians called Ibn Sa‘ud anything but sultan fof Najd, ie., not king of the Hijaz], to the point where one of their speakers—brother Shawkat ‘Ali—said: I am not ready to bear good witness to the government of this country.³²

Hafiz Wahba later confessed that there “was a radical difference in mentality and outlook between Nejdis and Moslems in other countries,” and “on this rock the Conference foundered, the dispute continuing to tage without hope of reconciliation.³³

The course of these seventy-eight hours of debates can be followed through sources long available, but a few new points suggest themselves. It has not been appreciated how the opposing parties first clashed over control of the congress itself, before substantive issues were raised for debate. At the outset, the officers were elected by a straight vote of those participants present in the hall; and right away the Indian Khilafat Committee delegation challenged this procedure. First they questioned the credentials of certain other delegations: “Before any work, we must know which members have the right to vote.” Then they favored a proportional form of representation, and demanded that each delegation enjoy voting power roughly commensurate with the size of the population it purported to represent.

As the election of officers was necessary even before such issues could be decided, these objections were temporarily put aside.³⁴ But when discussion of permanent statutes began (see appendix 6), entitlement to participation and mode of voting were central. Rashid Rida, who drew up a preliminary charter for the congress, made membership a simple function of Ibn Sa‘ud’s personal invitation.³⁵ This was resisted by many delegates, who eventually prevailed in establishing a system of threetiered representation: by Muslim states, by branches of the congress, and wherever appropriate by delegates of Muslim peoples chosen in the most representative manner possible. Each territory (guér) was then to be accorded a certain number of votes, based on a rough estimate of its importance, the degree of its independence, and the size of its Muslim population. By this agreement, India was awarded the largest number of votes (four of a total of fifty), stirring a protest from another delegation which claimed that each Muslim territory should be entitled to an equal say. Shawkat “Ali replied that “we in India are seventy million Muslims out of three hundred million, and if we wanted to, we could demand a fourth of the votes of the congress. But we are willing to settle for four votes and not more.³⁶

This was the first and only appearance of the idea of proportional representation in a Muslim congress. There was no attempt to actually apply the provision during the sessions, and late-arriving Egyptian delegates noted that each participant present in the hall had one vote regardless of how many other participants were in attendance from his own country.³⁷ The participants apparently thought to postpone the implementation of proportional representation until a subsequent and fuller congress, for many of the regions which were accorded votes in this system were not represented at all in this first congress.

In their arrangements for procedural order, the participants and delegates exhibited little evidence of experience, and this expanded the possibilities for conflict. They knew enough to provide for the formation of committees, but these failed for a time to function for lack of participants. The result was that the general sessions were not preceded by adequate preparation. “I see no great benefit in our meeting here,” said the Turkish delegate, “because the committees answerable to this session are unable to work. After noon prayer, part of their time is wasted waiting for those who do not show up, and more time passes drinking coffee without result. After evening prayer, they adjourn for dinner, so that the committees do nothing.³⁸ Well into the congress, the proposals committee had yet to assemble because a sufficient number of its members had yet to appear for a gathering. A quorum was therefore set for this committee of only one-fourth of its members.³⁹

The situation in the plenum was not better, and participants were often absent or drifted in late. On at least two occasions, the president of the congress failed to appear at all. After waiting in one instance for forty minutes, those present appointed another chairman in his place.⁴⁰ According to the semi-official Umm al-qura, average attendance at the general sessions was 49 of the 66 participants,⁴¹ and this rate of absenteeism did not reflect the extent and effects of tardiness. “It is unreasonable that we should order the affairs of the people,” said one delegate commenting on tardiness, “when we cannot order our own.⁴²

At the same time, certain delegates made a concerted effort to insert political items in the agenda. In private meetings held during the first stage of the congress, the “Ali brothers and Rashid Rida had pressed Ibn Sa‘ud to consent to a collective oath of congress delegates in the Ka‘ba. There they would pledge to do everything possible to rid the Arabian peninsula of all foreign influence. The oath’s advocates again raised the subject during a banquet held for them by Ibn Sa‘ud. “The King then invited me to speak,” wrote Hafiz Wahba.

After complimenting them on their zeal and brotherly interest, I asked them to define the words ‘Arabian Peninsula’. They said they had meant the Peninsula proper and Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Akaba, and Maan as well. I said that we must be practical; a statement of this kind might well involve the Hejaz in difficulties. Those present could not honestly say that they represented the entire Moslem world, and if in any way they were instrumental in putting the Hejaz into a diplomatically awkward position, they might not be able to give all the help they should. So there seemed no point in pursuing a fantasy. Delegates from Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt and Yemen were even then on the way, and the least they could do would be to wait until these delegates arrived before making such a pledge, for if the latter agreed to it, it would be their governments who would be able to do something to carry it out. Nothing, I concluded, could be lost by waiting for a few days.

As Wahba had expected, none of the official delegations would have anything to do with the proposed pledge and its implicit condemnation of British and French rule over areas bordering the peninsula proper. The oath was never taken.⁴³ A similar atmosphere prevailed in the deliberations of the proposals committee. Reminiscences of the committee’s proceedings, which were conducted in private and did not figure in any contemporary account, were published by “Ajaj Nuwayhid. From these it is clear that Ibn Sa‘ud’s insistence that the delegates exclude wider politics from their deliberations met with considerable resistance. For example, French and Spanish forces were then in the last stages of crushing “Abd al-Karim’s Rif rebellion in Morocco, and although the cause was lost, Muhammad “Ali proposed to the committee that the congress issue an urgent appeal to all Muslims for money to sustain the uprising. According to Nuwayhid, the proposal won the assent of all but the official Turkish delegate, who maintained that such issues were beyond the scope of the congress. “Listen, my brother,” pleaded Muhammad “Ali, “what is the difference between our appeal on behalf of “Abd al-Karim, and our appeals on your behalf when you fought the Greeks?” This was a transparent attempt to alter the purposes for which the congress had been convened. But the appeal was never launched, for while in the Ka‘ba at prayer, Muhammad “Ali and Amin al-Husayni belatedly learned that ‘Abd al-Karim already had surrendered himself to the French.⁴⁴

Rashid Rida provoked still more controversy when he proposed an Islamic pact (mithag islami) to be concluded among Muslim governments. According to this plan, disputes between Muslim states would be referred to the Meccan congress for arbitration. Rida thus envisioned the evolution of the congress from a symposium on the narrow issues of the Hijaz, to the founding session of a league of Muslim states. The official Egyptian delegation maintained that such a proposal far exceeded the terms of reference set down for the congress by Ibn Sa‘ud. Rida was advocating a political pact—so the wider world would perceive it— and the Egyptians could not enter into such an agreement. This opposition could not be overcome.⁴⁵ In a subtler manner, Muhammad “Ali suggested in the proposals committee that a resolution be passed calling upon Muslims not to spill Muslim blood. According to Nuwayhid, the real motive behind this seemingly right-spirited resolution was to influence West African Muslim soldiers in French service. These Muslim forces had played a prominent role in the suppression of Syrian unrest over the past several years.⁴⁶ The Saudis, however, may have thought the proposed resolution to be directed against them, as they had taken the Hijaz by sword, and Wahhabi forces had committed some unfortunate atrocities against other Muslims during the campaign. The resolution was defeated in a plenary vote by a majority of two to one, its opponents arguing again that it was not directly related to affairs of the Hijaz.⁴⁷ Only the constant vigilance of the official delegations assured that the congress was not plunged into political controversy by such motions.

Yet there were also serious disputes over the specifically Hijazi issues related to the welfare of pilgrims, matters within the formal purview of the congress. The lengthy debates over sanitary conditions, taxation of pilgrims, proposed railway construction, and the Hijaz railway, are outlined by Sékaly and the accounts derived from his work.⁴⁸ In general, the host delegations resisted the many proposals which meant outside Muslim regulation of Hijazi affairs, while participants from beyond tended to withhold commitments of support and promises of funds which the organizers pressed them to make. For proposed railway construction, the Egyptian delegation called for the creation of an international Muslim company, accountable to its stockholders; the host delegations insisted that the money be raised through unrestricted contributions. All agreed that the pilgrims should be taxed to raise money for general improvements; no one wished to bear the onus of collecting such taxes. The Khilafat delegation demanded that the Hijazi government’s books be opened to international Muslim inspection; the host delegations regarded accountability as an infringement of sovereignty.

But more contentious than all of these questions was the issue of Muslim religious freedom and pluralism in the holy cities. The pilgrimage brought together believers from widely scattered parts, with their own traditional rituals and formula of prayer. Yet part of the puritan Wahhabi vision had been to purify the holy cities of all practices not in accord with their rigorous fundamentalism. Shaykh Zawahiri described the consequences, as he witnessed them in the Grand Mosque in Mecca. In this scene, the incident revolved around the Wahhabi doctrine that Muslim supplicants address only God in prayer, and not his prophets.

I saw here with my own two eyes a thing that pained my soul. I was in the mosque yesterday, lingering after I had performed my circumambulations, and I saw a group of people surround an Egyptian. They castigated him vehemently, saying: “You prayed ‘Oh, Prophet of God’!” This frightened the Egyptian to his very soul. He disavowed having so prayed, shrank back, and was so terrified that it opened my eyes. He came to me after that, along with many of the Egyptians, saying to us: “You saw how they reproach us.” I calmed them down, told them not to be afraid, and to be patient until the truth becomes known by the guidance of God. I will not deny to you that I concealed in my heart that I, too, open my prayers with “Oh, Prophet of God.⁴⁹

An Indian delegate, with the support of other participants from India and Russia and the official Egyptian, Yemeni, and Afghan delegations, introduced a resolution that led to a heated exchange. He essentially proposed noninterference by the Hijazi authorities in the pilgrimage rites. Ibn Sa‘ud’s delegations united to decry the heretical “innovations” which had flourished in the holy cities before the Saudi conquest, and soundly defeated the resolution in a show of hands. An uproar followed, with Muhammad “Ali demanding a secret vote, and the Afghan delegate threatening that a Hijaz without religious freedom would lose the sympathy of all Islam. The same majority which defeated the resolution hurriedly passed another, which established a theological committee of ulama to examine the issue further. The session was adjourned in the midst of protestations.⁵⁰ The outbreak led Ibn Sa‘ud to issue what was essentially a reprimand to the congress, in which he spelled out his personal point of view. No pilgrim would be questioned about his beliefs; but no practices which contradicted the Muslim consensus could be permitted.⁵¹ This served only to excite further controversy.

According to Shaykh Zawahiri, “it became clear to the organizers that their best plan was at least to be rid of the congress this year. The secretary of the congress told me during its last days that the congress had dashed their hopes, and that the only thing important to them now was that it end in peace.⁵² The organizers secured from the unofficial delegations a last-minute resolution, introduced by Rashid Rida, favoring the inclusion of Ma‘an and ‘Aqaba in Hijazi and hence Saudi territory. They then succeeded in having the congress adjourned. The departing participants were given to understand that the congress would meet for a second time during the next pilgrimage season.⁵³ Upon this last resolution on Ma‘an and “Aqaba, and the promise of an annual congress, hinged those appraisals of the congress which saw it as an unmitigated Saudi success.

“‘T have gone closely into the proceedings of the Pan-islamic Congress held at Mecca in June,” wrote George Antonius to Sir Gilbert Clayton. “Tam inclined to believe that for the first time in many years, perhaps in the whole course of modern history, HMG find themselves faced with the problem of a, if not united, at any rate uniting, Islam; and… . you know how little I possess the temperament of an Islamophile alarmist.⁵⁴ Yet the Turkish delegate confided to the British vice consul that the results of the congress could be summed up in one word—“nil”—for “the Arabs can only agree on one thing, and that is, to disagree on everything.⁵⁵ And British Foreign Office minutes on the vice consul’s dispatches were no more sanguine. The congress evidenced “how hopelessly disunited Islam is and how little a pan-islamic conference can hope to achieve.⁵⁶ The congress had ended in an ambiguous fashion which at first lent support to utterly contradictory readings of its significance.

There were three major provisions made for the establishment of a permanent organization. First, it was determined that the congress would meet annually in Mecca. The participants even went so far as to debate, at some length, the proper policy in the event that war made a Meccan congress impossible in any given year. Second, the congress adopted an annual estimated budget of approximately £6,000 to £10,000, and it was agreed that each territory would contribute £300 per annum for each voting delegate permitted it by the proportional voting provision of the charter. From these dues, the expenses of convening the congress would be met, and the salaries of a permanent staff paid. Third, the election of an executive committee was made the task of the annual congress in session, and it was clearly intended that this committee be international in composition.⁵⁷ But the requirement of residence in the Hijaz left this task, as before, to Ibn Sa‘ud’s own organizers, since nearly all of the participants planned to return home at the conclusion of the congress. In this first congress, the election of the executive committee was therefore deferred, and a temporary committee of Saudi organizers was entrusted with interim administration.

But Rashid Rida did succeed, after some debate, in having his close friend Shakib Arslan, then in Geneva, elected to the post of secretary general. Rida evidently hoped to enjoy a preponderant influence over an institution, the creation of which he had advocated for over twenty-five years. With the election of Shakib Arslan, one of his closest associates, the goal was within reach. But there were participants who doubted that Arslan would leave a moderate clime to live in the Hijaz, so Rashid Rida wrote to him at length to assure him that the weather in Ta’if would suit him, particularly in the winter, and Rida even relayed daytime and nighttime temperatures.⁵⁸ In a second letter, Rida told Arslan that he would write to Ibn Sa‘ud to arrange for Arslan’s travel, and told the reluctant secretary general that his stay in Mecca would involve no expense, as Ibn Sa‘ud had covered all the costs incurred by the participants during the congress.⁵⁹ Arslan had plans to travel to America and so put off leaving for the Hijaz, but there seemed to be an understanding that he would in fact arrive at his post before the second congress.⁶⁰

The irrepressible Iqbal “Ali Shah was also sure that the congress would meet again: “The Conference will be held yearly and is destined to grow in importance. It is bound to exercise a tremendous influence upon the minds and thoughts of the two hundred and fifty million followers of the Prophet, a power which none can afford to ignore.⁶¹ In his quest for the limelight, he again offered his services to the British, seeking their aid in securing an appointment from Ibn Sa‘ud as a delegate from Great Britain to the second congress. “He was prepared at the conclusion of his visit to place at the disposal of Government a report, to be handed to His Majesty’s Consul, embodying such information as he might have recorded during his journey.⁶²

Tjokroaminoto, upon his return to Java, convened at Surabaja the sixth local Al-Islam conference, and had this broad organization transform itself formally into a branch of the Meccan organization. Seven separate provisions were made to collect £900, the sum which would be required of the three voting delegates whom the Muslims of the Netherlands East Indies were entitled to dispatch the following year.⁶³

But Rida was already receiving signals that there would not be a second congress. “The temporary committee has done nothing; indeed, it has not even met, as I had believed. The proceedings of the sessions are to be published by me, and I told the King [Ibn Sa‘ud], the president of the congress, and the [temporary] secretary, that publication was impossible because of the many Arabic errors in the text. Editing is essential. In the first place, I have not heard that they edited it… . I will mention to the King all that is necessary for the upcoming congress, by the next post.⁶⁴ By early March 1927, the generally reliable ‘Oriental correspondent’ of al-Muqattam was already expressing his belief that the second congress would not be held. He noted that the members of the temporary committee had yet to meet, and that the resolutions of the congress remained no more than ink on paper.⁶⁵ As the members of the temporary committee were those very same advisers to Ibn Sa‘ud who had convened the first congress, it can only be concluded that the lack of any action represented a conscious decision to discourage the convening of a second congress.

One reason for this decision was the fact that the congress had served as an open channel for uncensored criticism. Friends certainly were won to the Saudi cause at the congress, and most of the resolutions served in one way or another to legitimize Saudi policies. But the domestic costs of an open congress in a rapidly closing political system were high. The lone Meccan newspaper could not selectively suppress the contents of speeches in its almost daily account of the proceedings, accounts which were checked by the participants themselves and read by the inhabitants of what was still a newly subjugated province. With consolidation of Saudi rule in the Hijaz not yet complete, the prospect of published criticism by even a single congress participant from abroad was a cause for concern. Rashid Rida had almost certainly identified a similar obsession in the Ottoman opposition to a Meccan congress nearly thirty years earlier. He misunderstood the identical Saudi dilemma in believing that Ibn Sa‘ud favored the publication of the congress proceedings. In the form of a slim Arabic volume, these proceedings would have taken on new life as subversive literature, as insidious as Kawakibi’s Umm al-qura. They were never published.

The presence of foreign Muslim delegations perhaps also had an unhealthy effect upon Ibn Sa‘ud’s advisers, most of whom were foreign as well. This was in clearest evidence in the case of Hafiz Wahba, his Egyptian-born confidant, whose personal diplomacy had secured Egypt’s participation in the congress. A few months after the Egyptian delegation had returned home, Hafiz Wahba wrote an ingratiating letter to the Egyptian consul in Jidda, inspired by “my obligations as an Egyptian.”

The idea of the Islamic congress, and the goal which I sought to achieve through the participation of the Egyptian government, have already had the desired effect. Many of the ideas which the Egyptian delegation advocated, especially the idea of religious freedom, have had a great effect in India. My principal aim was to found a great bloc of Muslims who would involve themselves in this issue, until these people here would alter their behavior and their way of rule. Freedom of religion is among the most important matters sought by all Islamic governments.

Personal correspondence from India informs me that there is a great movement afoot over there, against Ibn Sa‘ud. The reasons for the movement go back in truth to the bad behavior exhibited by the people of his religious administration. I have always tried to ease the situation as much as possible, and the Indians in the rest of their speeches stand behind Egypt’s policy in the congress. I hope that Egypt takes a firm position which will raise her head in the Islamic world, and will render her the axis of Islam.⁶⁶

Ibn Sa‘ud’s mentality, continued Wahba, now approximated that of the detested ex-Sharif Husayn, and Wahba praised the young Prince Sa‘ud, “for disagreeing with his father in the conduct of administration.” This dispatch gave evidence of just one of many possibilities for anti-Saudi intrigue among Ibn Sa‘ud’s advisers opened by the congress and its delegations.

Expense was also a major consideration. The unofficial delegations probably arrived under their own steam, but were then maintained, in some instances for several months, at Ibn Sa‘ud’s expense.⁶⁷ According to Rashid Rida, Ibn Sa‘ud paid for accommodation, board, and local transportation. Aside from Rida, who received a large sum mentioned earlier,⁶⁸ other sympathetic delegates also received sums of money from Ibn Sa‘ud. Amin al-Husayni was awarded £1,000, “and many of the others received amounts varying from £200 to £600. It is calculated that, with presents, bribes, and other incidental expenditure, the conference cost Ibn Sa‘ud £20,000.⁶⁹ By all accounts, the affair was expensive, and for this reason the burden had been shifted to the participants. But it was one which they were unlikely to bear, and the small Saudi treasury had to face the prospect of heavy subventions to a forum of dubious utility.

Perhaps the most important disincentive to the reconvening of the congress was the behavior of the Indian Khilafat Committee delegation upon their return home. Muhammad ‘Ali opened an unrestrained campaign of speeches and articles severely critical of Saudi policy and the conduct of the congress.⁷⁰ In his own newspaper, the Urdu Hamdard of Delhi, he expressed no hope for the success of the projected congress executive committee (“seven more paid servants” for Ibn Sa‘ud), and suggested that the congress would be used by crowds of Syrian, Hijazi, and Najdi hangers-on to embezzle awqaf funds.⁷¹ Once he and his brother began to urge Indian Muslims to forego the pilgrimage, Ibn Sa‘ud grew concerned. With the occupation of the Hijaz, income from the pilgrimage quickly had become the principal source of Saudi state revenue, and Indian Muslims represented a large portion of the annual influx. Ibn Sa‘ud sent an emissary to India with the express purpose of refuting the charges of the Khilafat leaders, and the ulama of Madina, presented with an inquiry especially mentioning the ‘Ali brothers and Shu‘ayb Qurashi, issued a fatwa reiterating the obligatory nature of the pilgrimage. “Whosoever denies that it is such a duty is an infidel.⁷² The congress thus had all the attributes of a domestic political and economic liability, and so was allowed to expire.

In 1927 Ahmad Shafiq, a close associate of Rashid Rida’s, arrived in Mecca and met with Tawfiq al-Sharif, who had been the congress secretary during sessions and Ibn Sa‘ud’s emissary to India, and was now on the temporary committee. Sharif blamed the inactivity on the unwillingness of those states which had sent official delegations to send them again, and the attitude adopted by the “Ali brothers. In a meeting with Ibn Sa‘ud, Shafiq urged a new Muslim congress to end sectarian differences, and Ibn Sa‘ud ordered three of his advisers—Hafiz Wahba, Yusuf Yasin, and Fu’ad Hamza—to assist Shafiq in the task. But then Shafiq was told not to spread word of the congress until the opinions of the various Muslim states had been determined.⁷³ The appeal was never made public. By 1928, Iqbal Ali Shah’s enthusiasm for the Saudi-sponsored congress had also waned, and he was busy approaching the Foreign Office about his own plan for a “Grand Moslem Conference for the Cultural Regeneration of Islam,” a scheme which was rebuffed.⁷⁴

In 1929, the elected secretary general of the congress, Shakib Arslan, performed the pilgrimage. He later wrote an effusive tract on the visit, in which he lavished praise on the administration and character of Ibn Sa‘ud.⁷⁵ But, as one of Arslan’s Arab biographers notes, there was a striking omission from this account. “He does not discuss with us the organization of the great pilgrimage congress (mu’tamar al-hajj al-akbar), and putting it to use for the benefit of Islam and the welfare of the Muslims; yet he expands upon matters far less weighty than this great issue, as in his discussion of the kindness of the pilgrims’ guides.⁷⁶ Arslan’s presence in the Hijaz would have been a suitable opportunity for Ibn Sa‘ud to have reconvened the congress had he sought to do so, but obviously he did not, and so Arslan avoided the issue entirely in his book.

Ibn Sa‘ud instead went his own way, and adopted an unequivocal policy as rigid as that of the Ottomans, prohibiting all activity that could be construed as political during the pilgrimage. To convey his own message at that season, he developed an alternative to the banned congress that continues in an altered form, as an annual tradition. In 1928 he reopened the congress building for a tea party of prominent pilgrims, and within a few years the event had evolved into the pilgrimage banquet, usually held at one of the royal palaces near Mecca.⁷⁷ On this annual occasion, before the most distinguished pilgrims, Ibn Sa‘ud delivered a monologue on the theme of Muslim solidarity. Once his speech had been rendered into Urdu, other selected speakers offered supplementary remarks. The forum was formally social, enjoyed no authority to debate and resolve, and was suited to Ibn Sa‘ud’s authoritarian requirements and disposition. Until his death in 1953, there remained in effect an inviolable prohibition against any more formal demonstration of Muslim solidarity at Mecca.

Appendix Six

Constitution of the Congress of the Islamic World

Source: Al-Ahram, June 23, 30, 1926.

In the name of God, the All-Merciful, the Compassionate In response to the invitation of His Excellency “Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud, the Congress of the Islamic World met on Monday, Dhu al-Hijja 26, 1344, and set down the following constitution for this and subsequent congresses:

Art. 1. —This congress will be known as the Congress of the Islamic World.

Art. 2. —The aims of the Congress are: a). to promote mutual understanding and unity among Muslims, in realization of God’s words, “verily, the believers are brethren”;

b). to examine and advance the religious, social, cultural, and economic development of the Muslims;

c). to examine and promote the improvement of security in the holy precincts of the Hijaz; to better the facilities for transportation, health, communications; to facilitate the pilgrimage, and to remove all obstacles which impede the fulfillment of this religious duty; to guarantee the integrity of the Hijaz, and to safeguard its rights.

Art. 3. —The Congress will meet in Mecca each year during the pilgrimage season. Should that prove impossible, the Congress will convene in another independent Muslim land. Should that, too, prove impossible, guidance will be sought in God’s admonition, “and serve God as you are best able.”

Art. 4. —These are the lands of the Islamic world, in [Arabic] alphabetical order: South and West Africa; East Africa; Afghanistan; South America; North America; Europe (its Muslim population); Iran; Turkey; Tunisia; Java and Sumatra; Algeria; Ethiopia; the Hijaz; the Persian Gulf; Russia; the Rif; Zanzibar; the Sudan; Syria; Transjordan; China; Tripolitania; Iraq; Asir; Palestine; the Philippines; the Congo; Morocco; Egypt; Malaya and Ceylon; the Najd; India; and Yemen.

Each of these countries shall have one vote, with certain modifications. The Hijaz, as it contains the site which all Muslims face in prayer, shall have three votes; Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, the Najd, and Yemen, since they are independent countries, shall each have two votes; India, since it is the most populous Muslim land, shall have four votes; and for the same reason, China shall have three votes, Java together with Sumatra shall also have three, and Russia shall have two votes.

Art, 5. —The Congress shall be comprised of:

a). delegates of independent governments;

b). delegates of branch committees of this Congress in lands where such committees exist;

c). representatives of Muslim peoples, selected in the most representative manner possible in every Muslim land.

Art. 6. —The direction of the Congress shall be entrusted to a president, first vice president, second vice president, and a secretary general. In some lands, branches of the secretariat general shall be established, and these will be linked to the central secretariat general.

Art. 7. —The Congress shall establish an executive committee, including the president of the Congress and the two vice presidents to be elected at the opening session, as well as six additional members and a secretary general, to be elected at the closing session. One of the six shall be the treasurer. These members and the secretary general shall always reside at the headquarters of the Congress. In the absence of the president, the sessions of the executive committee will be presided over by one of the two vice presidents, or the secretary general.

Art, 8. —If the presidency should become vacant, either of the vice presidents or the secretary general shall fill the office. If the secretariat or one of the six positions on the executive committee should become vacant, then the executive committee shall select a replacement.

Art. 9. —The executive committee shall set the date for convening the second congress during the next pilgrimage season, and will issue the invitations.

Art. 10. —At the opening of the Congress, the session shall be presided over by the previous president, one of the vice presidents, or the eldest member of the executive committee. A new president shall then immediately be elected by secret ballot. The secretary general, the secretaries of congress branches (as provided by article 6), and the six members of the executive committee (mentioned in article 7), shall be elected during the closing session of the congress. Some or all of these office holders may be reelected.

Art. 11. —Prior to the opening session, every delegate must present his credentials to the secretary general, or to a body designated to examine them.

Art. 12. —The duties of the president are to preside over the Congress sessions, to convene them at the appointed times, to keep order, to give the floor and address questions, to order votes, to adjourn the sessions at their close, to set the time of subsequent sessions, and to supervise the implementation of the Congress resolutions and the activities of the secretariats general in various countries.

Art. 13. —The duties of the two vice presidents are to exercise all the functions of the president during his absence, and to assist the president if necessary.

Art. 14. —The duties of the secretary general are to handle executive and administrative affairs under the guidance of the president, to see to the implementation of the Congress resolutions, to direct the activities of the central secretariat general, to conduct correspondence and send invitations to the meetings, to prepare the annual budget with the approval of the executive committee, to keep accounts, to issue an annual report on Congress activities, to maintain constant contact with the secretaries general abroad and with branches of the congress, and to carry out any other tasks delegated by the president.

Art. 15. —The duty of the secretaries general abroad is to fulfill tasks like those of the Congress secretary general, each in his own country. They will maintain contact with the central secretariat general, which will assign various duties to them.

Art. 16. —All of the members of the executive committee shall be entrusted with carrying out those activities assigned to them by the congress, under the supervision of the president and secretary general. They shall be individually and collectively responsible for their actions.

Art. 17. —The president, the vice presidents, the remaining secresecretaries, and the other members of the executive committee, shall be responsible for their actions before the Congress.

Art. 18, —The central secretary general, the secretaries general in the various countries, and members of the executive committee, shall receive salaries fixed for them by the Congress.

Art. 19, —The duties of the treasurer are to collect revenues and issue receipts, and to authorize expenditures in return for receipts. He shall register all income and expenses in his books immediately, and he shall be responsible for the accounting and financial activities.

Art. 20. —From time to time, the Congress shall issue instructions as to the use of its funds and the amounts to be held by the treasurer.

Art. 21. —The fiscal year of the Congress shall terminate at the end of the lunar month of Sha‘ban, and shall begin at the start of the lunar month of Ramadan.

Art. 22. —Each year the Congress shall appoint a competent accountant to study its books, and he shall submit a report to the Congress by the first day of the lunar month of Dhu al-Qa‘da.

Art. 23. —The Congress shall issue instructions to authorize the withdrawal of funds from their place of deposit, and their disbursement by the treasurer.

Art. 24, —Every member of the agenda committee who has a proposal shall submit it in writing to the secretary general of the Congress three days before the opening of the Congress, signed by the initiator and at least one other sponsor. Every delegation from the countries listed in article 4 shall be entitled to appoint one member to this committee, or more, depending upon its voting strength. These members, as well as the president and the two vice presidents elected on the first day (as stipulated in article 10), and the secretary general, shall constitute the agenda committee.

As for late-arriving delegations, they shall appoint their member to the committee on the day of their arrival. On the opening day of the Congress, the secretary general shall present the received proposals to this committee for its consideration. The committee shall then issue them in the form of the Congress agenda. Late proposals shall not be accepted unless there are extenuating circumstances, in which case the committee may consider them as appendices to the agenda.

Art. 25. —Unwritten proposals shall not be accepted. Should a nonmember wish to submit a proposal, he must do so to the secretary general at least three days in advance. Should the initiator be a member, no time limit on submission shall apply. The secretary general shall submit all such proposals to the agenda committee, and the committee shall determine what is acceptable for submission to the Congress.

Art. 26. —All questions discussed by the Congress shall be decided by an absolute majority of the votes. In the event of a tie, the president’s vote shall be decisive. A quorum shall consist of delegations from six of those countries listed in article 4, unless a modification of this Charter is envisioned, in which case the quorum specified in article 27 shall be required.

Art. 27. —No amendment, addition, or deletion shall be made to the text of this Constitution without a two-thirds majority of attending members, in the presence of delegations from at least ten of the countries listed in article 4.

Art. 28. —The executive committee shall legally represent the Congress when out of session. The secretary general shall hold power of attorney for the committee, and may retain whomsoever he wishes as the committee’s legal counsel.

Art. 29, —Each year, the secretary general, with the assent of the executive committee, shall present a detailed report on the income and expenditures of the Congress for the fiscal year ending in the month of Sha‘ban prior to the Congress. He shall also present a budget for the coming year, as provided in article 14. The Congress may revise and amend this budget before approving it.

Art. 30. —The sum comprising the annual budget of the Congress shall be provided by all the Islamic countries which are members, in proportion to their voting strength. The contribution of each country must be paid before its delegates may exercise the prerogatives of membership.

Art, 31. —The permanent expenses of the Congress shall consist of:

£300 Expenses of convening the Congress. 500 Postage, telegrams, publications, etc. 1000 Furnishings.

360-600 6 x £20-£40 6 x £20-£40 6 x £8-£12 3 x £3 200

Yearly salary of the secretary general.

Monthly salaries of six members of the executive committee.

Monthly salaries of six regional secretaries general. Monthly salaries of six clerks at secretariat general. Monthly salaries of three servants.

Miscellaneous Equals a minimum total of £6,224, and a maximum of £9,632.

Every country listed in article 4 shall provide the Congress with dues of £300 annually per vote. A country’s delegation shall not be admitted to the Congress until such dues are paid.

Art. 32.

Resolutions related to the Hijaz shall be submitted by the Congress president to the government of the Hijaz for examination and, if possible, implementation.

Notes

1. Achille Sékaly, Le Congrès du Khalifat et le Congrès du Monde Musulman (Paris, 1926), 11-25, 125-219. back to text
2. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1925, vol. 1, The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement (Oxford, 1927), 308-19. Writing in other languages but relying upon the same sources were F. Taillardat, “Les Congrès interislamiques de 1926,” Bulletin du Comité de l’Asie française, nos. 246-47 (January-February 1927); and Hadsch Moh. Nafi Tschelebi, “Die Bruderschaft Arabiens und der islamische Weltkongress zu Mekka 1926,” Welt des Islams, o.s., 10 (1927-29): 33-42. back to text
3. Material related to the Meccan congress was culled by Shaykh Zawahiri’s son from some papers that remained in his father’s possession. Fakhr al-Din al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, al-Siyasa wa’l-Azhar, min mudhakkirat Shaykh al-Islam al-Zawahiri (Cairo, 1364/1954), 229-63. back to text
4. Hafiz Wahba, Jazirat al-‘arab fi’l-qarn al-‘ishrin, 267-75; translated as Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Arabian Days (London, 1964). back to text
5. Shakib Arslan, Sayyid Rashid Rida aw ikha’ arba‘in sanna (Damascus, 1356/1937), 443 ff. back to text
6. ‘Ajaj Nuwayhid, “al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni fi’l-mu’tamar al-islami al-‘amm fi Makka,” al-Adib (Beirut) 34, no. 8 (August 1975): 32-37. back to text
7. Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, “First Moslem Congress,” The Times (London), July 21-23, 1926; and Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, “The Meccan Conference,” Contemporary Review (London) 130, no. 9 (September 1926): 304-11. On his visit to the Muslim delegation from the Soviet Union, “at the instigation of this agency,” see enclosure in Jordan (Jidda), dispatch of July 3, 1926, FO371/11446, E4319/1426/91, Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London (hereafter FO). back to text
8. Although the value of this is diminished by his occasional reliance upon Iqbal ‘Ali Shah for certain details. See these two principal reports: Jordan (Jidda), enclosure in dispatch of June 23, 1926; and enclosure in dispatch of July 15, 1926, FO371/11433, E4186/4677/20/91, FO. back to text
9. Report by Shaykh Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, undated MS., Mahfuzat Ri’asat al-Jumhuriyya (Archives of the Presidency of the Republic), Cairo (hereafter MRJ), file 1477, “Mu’tamar Makka al-islami.” Also Report by Egyptian consul Amin Tawfiq (Jidda), enclosed in his dispatch of September 1, 1926, MRJ, file 1477, “Mu’tamar Makka al-islami.” back to text
10. Text of Ibn Sa‘ud’s telegram to invited participants, enclosed in Jordan (Jidda), dispatch of May 1, 1926, L/P&S/10/1115, P. 1939 (E3198/367/91), Political and Secret Archives, India Office Records, London (hereafter IOR, P&S). back to text
11. Ibn Sa‘ud’s proclamation on the day of his acclamation as king of the Hijaz, in Umm al-qura (Mecca), January 8, 1926. back to text
12. Zawahiri Report. back to text
13. On the movement, see Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York, 1982). The study ends with the convening of the Meccan congress, by which time, it is argued, the ‘Ali brothers were in eclipse. For other accounts, see A. C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924 (The Hague, 1972); and Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims 1860-1923 (Cambridge, 1974). back to text
14. Zawahiri Report. back to text
15. Qurashi (Mecca) to ‘Abd al-Rahman Siddiqi, January 9, 1926, translated in secret report of February 19, 1926, L/P&S/10/1165, P&J (S) 258, IOR, P&S and Public and Judicial Archives, India Office Records, London. The rebuff of this delegation is described by Jordan (Jidda), dispatch of January 29, 1926, FO406/57, FO. back to text
16. Almez, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto (Jakarta, 1952), 171-73. back to text
17. Zawahiri Report. back to text
18. Zawahiri Report. back to text
19. Charles Hertopp (Cairo) to Jordan (Jidda), May 29, 1926, FO371/11433, E3505/20/91, FO. Abu al-‘Aza’im’s role at the Meccan congress is described by ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Muhammad Shuqruf, al-Imam Muhammad Madi Abu al-‘Aza’im (Cairo, 1972), 246-52. back to text
20. Zawahiri Report. back to text
21. Rida (Mecca) to Arslan, June 19, 1926, in Arslan, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 445. back to text
22. Tawfiq Report. Also Jordan (Jidda), enclosure in dispatch of July 31, 1926, L/P&S/10/1115, E4937/367/91, IOR, P&S. back to text
23. Al-Manar (Cairo) 28, no. 6 (August 27, 1927): 465-73. back to text
24. Zawahiri Report. back to text
25. Jordan (Jidda), enclosure in dispatch of July 15, 1926, FO371/11433, 4677/20/91, FO. back to text
26. Zawahiri Report. back to text
27. Jordan (Jidda), enclosure in dispatch of June 23, 1926, FO371/11433, E4186/20/91, FO. back to text
28. On the delegation’s wait in Cairo, see al-Muqattam (Cairo), June 1 and 20, 1926. On the Iranian prime minister’s statement, see Iran, June 25, 1926, as quoted in FO371/11433, E4327/20/91, FO. back to text
29. Jordan (Jidda), enclosure in dispatch of June 23, 1926, FO371/11433, E4186/20/91, FO. back to text
30. For Ibn Sa‘ud’s remarks, see Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 128-31. back to text
31. Toynbee, Survey 1925, 315. back to text
32. Zawahiri Report. back to text
33. Wahba, Arabian Days, 156-57. back to text
34. Umm al-qura (Mecca), June 11, 1926; Wadi al-Nil (Cairo), June 16, 1926. back to text
35. Rashid Rida’s proposed charter in Umm al-qura (Mecca), June 11, 1926. back to text
36. Al-Siyasa (Cairo), June 24, 1926; Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 137. back to text
37. Zawahiri Report. back to text
38. Umm al-qura (Mecca), July 2, 1926. back to text
39. Umm al-qura (Mecca), July 2, 1926. back to text
40. Al-Ahram (Cairo), June 16 and 30, 1926. back to text
41. Umm al-qura (Mecca), July 14, 1926. back to text
42. Umm al-qura (Mecca), June 18, 1926. back to text
43. Wahba, Arabian Days, 157-58. For the plenary discussion of the proposal to rid Arabia of foreign influence, see Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 163-66. Only in light of Wahba’s account does Sékaly’s report of Arabian opposition to the proposal make sense. back to text
44. Nuwayhid, “al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni,” 36-37. back to text
45. Zawahiri Report. back to text
46. Nuwayhid, “al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni,” 35. back to text
47. Umm al-qura (Mecca), July 9 and 14, 1926. back to text
48. See in particular Sékaly’s introduction, Congrès du Khalifat, 16-24. The issue of slavery (Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 201) was raised by a participant only at the urging of the British vice consul at Jidda, and would otherwise not have figured in the proceedings. See Jordan (Jidda), dispatch of July 20, 1926, FO371/11446, E4678/900/91, FO. The restoration of the Hijaz railway to Muslim control (Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 155-62) was a constant subject of Muslim discussion. For the background to this controversy, see W. L. Ochsenwald, “A Modern Waqf: The Hijaz Railway, 1900-48,” Arabian Studies 3 (1976): 1-12. back to text
49. Zawahiri Report. back to text
50. Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 183-86. back to text
51. Text in Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 189-92; Umm al-qura (Mecca), July 6, 1926; Arabic text also in Georg Kampffmeyer, “Urkunden und Berichte zur Gegenwartsgeschichte des arabischen Orients,” Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin 30, no. 2 (1927): 140-60. back to text
52. Zawahiri Report. back to text
53. For these resolutions, see Umm al-qura (Mecca), July 23, 1926; Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 207-9. back to text
54. George Antonius (Jerusalem) to Sir Gilbert Clayton, September 11, 1926, Clayton Papers, Sudan Archive, Durham University Library. back to text
55. Jordan (Jidda), enclosure no. 1 in dispatch of August 9, 1926, FO371/11433, E4677/20/91, FO. back to text
56. Minute by V. A. L. Mallet, August 10, 1926, FO371/11433, E4677/20/91, FO. back to text
57. Sékaly, Congrès du Khalifat, 210. back to text
58. Rida (Mecca) to Arslan, July 8, 1926, in Arslan, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 446-49. back to text
59. Rida (Cairo) to Arslan, September 16, 1926, in Arslan, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 454. back to text
60. Rida to Arslan, December 10, 1926, in Arslan, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 461. back to text
61. Shah, “The Meccan Conference,” 310. back to text
62. Memorandum to Wakely on request of Ikbal Ali Shah, dated April 5, 1927, L/P&S/10/806, IOR, P&S. This file contains various offers of services from Iqbal ‘Ali Shah, all of which were rejected. back to text
63. Henry Fitzmaurice (Batavia), dispatch of October 8, 1926, FO371/11476, E6347/1511/65, FO. Rashid Rida expressed his satisfaction; see al-Manar (Cairo) 27, no. 8 (November 5, 1926): 638-40. back to text
64. Rida to Arslan, September 16, 1926, in Arslan, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 455. back to text
65. Al-Muqattam (Cairo), March 4, 1927. back to text
66. Wahba to Amin Bey [Tawfiq], October 22, 1926, MRJ, file 1480, part 1. back to text
67. The Soviet Muslim delegates described collection of the money necessary for the journey. See the interview in al-Siyasa (Cairo), June 16, 1926. back to text
68. Rida (Mecca) to Arslan, June 19, 1926, in Arslan, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 445. back to text
69. Jordan (Jidda), enclosure in dispatch of July 31, 1926, L/P&S/10/1115, E4937/367/91, IOR, P&S. The Tawfiq Report also gives the sums of various gifts, and the identical figure of £1,000 for Amin al-Husayni. back to text
70. For details on the campaign, see al-Manar (Cairo) 27, no. 7 (October 17, 1926): 548-55. See also the unsigned memorandum entitled “The Khilafatist Wahabi Case,” Jerusalem, January 8, 1927, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, division 65, file 31. Rashid Rida’s reply to Muhammad ‘Ali appeared in al-Manar (Cairo) 29, no. 3 (June 18, 1928): 162-80. back to text
71. Intelligence Report no. 31, Government of India, FO371/11433, E5595/20/91, FO. back to text
72. Text in Norman Mayers (Jidda), dispatch of January 9, 1927, L/P&S/10/1155, P. 1527, IOR, P&S. back to text
73. Ahmad Shafiq, A‘mali ba‘da mudhakkirati (Cairo, 1941), 285-86. back to text
74. Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah to Shuckburgh, August 8, 1928, FO371/13043, E4125/2492/65, FO. back to text
75. Shakib Arslan, al-Irtisamat al-lutaf fi khatir al-hajj fi aqdas mataf (Cairo, 1350/1931). back to text
76. Ahmad al-Sharabasi, Amir al-bayan Shakib Arslan, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1963), 2:522. back to text
77. There was some confusion in 1928, as many thought this was the overdue second congress. The choice of this site may have been intended to leave that impression. See Muhammad al-Sa‘id (Jidda), dispatch of June 5, 1928, in Dar al-Watha’iq al-Qawmiyya (Egyptian National Archives), Cairo, ‘Abdin: al-khilafa al-islamiyya, uncatalogued box; unsigned draft dispatch (Cairo), May 31, 1928, Archives of the French Embassy, Cairo, carton 131, file 26/3; Umm al-qura (Mecca), June 8, 1928. back to text